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PROSECUTING GUANTANAMO IN EUROPE: CAN AND SHALL THE
MASTERMINDS OF THE "TORTURE MEMOS" BE HELD CRIMINALLY
RESPONSIBLE ON THE BASIS OF UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION?
Kai Ambos*
Investigating the secrets surrounding Guantnamo Bay and other U.S. pris-
ons overseas and prosecuting those responsible for serious human rights
violations-especially the so-called "harsh interrogation techniques" al-
luded to in the "torture memos" of the former George W. Bush administra-
tion-is currently en vogue in Europe. This paper will show, however, that
the chances that such prosecutions will formally commence are rather low.
The paper analyzes the jurisdictional and related procedural requirements
of such prosecutions in three representative European countries (Belgium,
Germany, and Spain). These countries have been selected because they pos-
sess different legal regimes for prosecuting extraterritorial offences, which
in turn present different legal issues. While Germany has perhaps the
broadest universal jurisdiction regime in Europe on paper, Belgium and
Spain have been particularly proactive in prosecuting international crimes,
despite a recent legislative and policy rollback de facto derogating univer-
sal jurisdiction. Taken together, the law and practice in these countries
stand for the general trend of a more cautious and restrictive approach with
regard to the extraterritorial prosecution of international crimes, replacing
universal jurisdiction proper with a subsidiary or cooperative surrogate.
This gives reason, in the conclusion of this paper, to reassess the strategy
for dealing with international core crimes, turning from a less criminal law
or prosecution based to a more comprehensive approach.
* Professor of Criminal Law, Criminal Procedure, Comparative Law, and International
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the infamous "torture memos," i.e., the memoranda concerning
the treatment of the so-called "enemy combatants" held at Guantinamo Bay
and other U.S. prisons overseas, senior officials of the former Bush Admin-
istration argued that "harsh interrogation techniques" were consistent with
international law, in particular international humanitarian law. These inter-
rogation techniques included waterboarding, pushing detainees against a
wall, facial slaps, cramped confinement, stress positions, and sleep and food
deprivation.' It was further argued that if an act was committed outside the
territory of a State, the human rights law treaties and conventions to which
that State was a party would not be binding extraterritorially, and therefore
would not be applicable.2 As to the torture prohibition under international
law, it was argued that Article 1 of the Convention Against Torture defines
torture as "severe pain" and thus shows that any lesser pain could not be
considered torture. Treatment amounting to torture must induce excruciat-
ing, agonizing pain equaling serious injuries; 3 the infliction of non-lethal
pain is excluded.4 The treatment of detainees at GuantAnamo Bay, which
consisted of up to twenty hours of intense interrogations on most days
over a period of nearly two months, would thus not amount to inhuman
treatment. 5
The memos were drafted by senior officials of the Bush Adminis-
tration. The so-called "Bush Six" were Alberto Gonzales, former Attorney
General; Professor John Yoo and Jay Bybee, both from the Office of Legal
Counsel of the Justice Department (OLC); Douglas Feith, former Underse-
cretary of Defense for Policy; William Haynes II, former general counsel
for the Department of Defense; and David Addington, former Vice Presi-
dent Richard "Dick" Cheney's Chief of Staff.6 But the memos were also
I Obama Publishes 'Torture' Memos, BBC.coM, Apr. 16, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/
hi/americas/8003023.stm (last visited Nov. 13, 2009).
2 See Memorandum from Patrick F. Philbin & John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Att'ys
Gen., to William J. Haynes, II, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Dep't of Def. (Dec. 28, 2001), in THE
TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB 29, 36-37 (Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua L.
Dratel eds., 2005) [hereinafter TORTURE PAPERS].
3 Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to
Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President (Aug.1, 2002), in TORTURE PAPERS, supra
note 2, at 172.
4 See id.
5 Kathleen T. Rhem, Alleged Guantanamo Abuse Did Not Rise to Level of 'Inhumane',
AM. FORCES PRESS SERVICE, July 13, 2005, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.
aspx?id=16651 (last visited Nov. 13, 2009).
6 See Scott Horton, The Bush Six to be Indicted, DAILY BEAST, Apr. 13, 2009,
http'/www.thedailybeast.corn/blogs-and-stories/2009-04-13/the-bush-six-to-be-indicted/
(last visited Nov. 13, 2009).
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backed by the White House. As soon as February 7, 2002, President Bush
signed an order stating, "I accept the legal conclusion of the Department
of Justice and determine that none of the provisions of Geneva apply
to our conflict with al Qaeda in Afghanistan or elsewhere throughout the
world ....",7 This presidential order further declared that none of the cap-
tured Taliban or al-Qaeda detainees qualified for P.O.W. status according to
the Geneva Conventions.8 Thus, not surprisingly, it has been argued that the
U.S. administration entered legal no man's land and set up its own rules. 9
On April 16, 2009, the Obama Administration released four secret
memos, produced by the OLC, which authorized interrogators to use the
interrogation methods mentioned above. 10 The release of these further me-
moranda once again led to a call for an independent investigation of the
Bush Administration's conduct.11 On August 24, 2009, Attorney General
Eric Holder appointed federal prosecutor John Durham to look into abuse
allegations revealed by an internal CIA inspector general's report 12 accord-
ing to which, inter alia, interrogators once threatened to kill a 9/11 suspect's
children and forced another suspect to watch his mother be sexually as-
saulted. 13 This appointment led to further discussions about the pros and
cons of investigating the alleged abuses. 14
This paper examines if criminal prosecutions of the masterminds of
the torture memos in Europe are legally and politically possible, focusing on
the jurisdictional and related procedural requirements in three representative
countries (Belgium, Germany, and Spain). Clearly, this is a limited ap-
7 Presidential Memorandum on Humane Treatment of al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees I
(Feb. 7, 2002), available at http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/detainees/diaprevious-releases/
fourthrelease/DIAfourth-release.pdf (last visited Nov. 13, 2009).
8 Id. at2.
9 See PHILIPPE SANDS, TORTURE TEAM: RUMSFELD'S MEMO AND THE BETRAYAL OF
AMERICAN VALUES 18 (2008) (asserting the Bush administration made Guantdnamo Bay a
"legal black hole").
10 These memos are available at the American Civil Liberties Union website: http://www.
aclu.org/safefree/general/olc_memos.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2009).
1I See Center for Constitutional Rights, Impeach Torture Architect Jay Bybee,
http'J/ccrjustice.org/get-involved/action/impeach-torture-architect-jay-bybee (last visited
Nov. 13, 2009).
12 CIA, INSPECTOR GENERAL, SPECIAL REVIEW, COUNTERTERRORISM AND DETENTION
ACTIVITIES (SEPTEMBER 2001-OCTOBER 2003) (2003-7123-IG) (May 7, 2004) (redacted
version), available at http://luxmedia.vo.llnwd.net/ol0/clients/aclu/IG_Report.pdf (last vi-
sited Nov. 13, 2009).
13 Mark Mazzetti & Scott Shane, C.IA. Abuse Cases Detailed in Report on Detainees,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 2009, at Al, available at http'J/www.nytimes.com/2009/08/25/us/
politics/25detain.html?scp=l&sq=cia%20interrogations%20kill&st-cse (last visited Nov. 13,
2009).
14 See Prosecuting the CIA., N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 2009, http://roomfordebate.blogs.
nytimes.com/2009/08/24/prosecuting-the-cia/ (last visited Nov. 13, 2009).
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proach in terms of the legal regimes and the countries analyzed. It is how-
ever justified for the following reasons. The countries selected constitute a
representative sample among the European jurisdictions in that they possess
different legal regimes and practices with regard to the prosecution of extra-
territorial offences. These differences present, in turn, different legal and
practical issues which make their comparison interesting and rewarding
with a view to the future of universal jurisdiction in Europe. While Germa-
ny currently has perhaps the broadest universal jurisdiction regime in Eu-
rope (at least on paper), Belgium and Spain have recently suffered a legisla-
tive rollback de facto derogating universal jurisdiction but still are consi-
dered as the most active jurisdictions. 15 As to the focus on the jurisdictional
and related issues, it should be noted that this does not mean that the rele-
vant substantive law, in particular the form or mode of liability of the (intel-
lectual) authors of the torture memos, does not present tricky problems. The
opposite is the case, but at this stage of the proceedings these problems are
of no practical relevance and, indeed, they will never become relevant if the
result of this investigation--that no prosecutions or even trials will ever take
place-proves to be correct.
II. PROSECUTION IN EUROPE
A. Belgium
While torture is a criminal offence under Belgian law as an individ-
ual act 16 and a crime against humanity (see infra), Belgium lacks jurisdic-
tion to prosecute the masterminds of the torture memos. The 1993 Belgian
law to prosecute international crimes has been amended three times, ulti-
mately preventing victims from directly triggering proceedings and abolish-
ing universal jurisdiction. Thus, it is not surprising that, to the knowledge of
this author, so far no complaint with regard to Guantdnamo or the torture
memos has been filed in Belgium.
15 See Wolfgang Kaleck, From Pinochet to Rumsfeld: Universal Jurisdiction in Europe
1998-2008, 30 MICH. J. INT'L L. 927, 935 (2009) ("Belgium is still one of the most active
jurisdictions in pursuing international crimes."); id at 954 ("Spain has perhaps become the
most welcoming forum for those seeking accountability for international crimes.").
16 PENAL CODE (BeIg.) art. 417bis-art. 417 quinquies, available at httpJ/www.juridat.be/
cgiloi/loial .pl?cn= 1867060801&language--fr&caller=list&la-F&fromtab=loi&tri=dd+AS
+RANK&rech=l&numero=l&sql=(text+contains+('))#LNK0106 (last visited Nov. 13,
2009) See also httpJ/www.ejustice.just.fgov.be/loi/loi.htm (last visited Nov. 13, 2009). See
Comm. Against Torture, Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrad-
ing Treatment or Punishment, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under
Article 19 of the Convention, Addendum, Belgium, 19, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/52/Add.2 (July 8,
2002).
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1. The law
a. The original version of 1993
In 1993, the Belgian Parliament adopted the "Act Concerning the
Punishment of Grave Breaches of the Geneva Conventions and Their Addi-
tional Protocols" (Act) 7 in order to incorporate the grave breaches of inter-
national humanitarian law as criminal offences in the domestic law. The Act
provided for unlimited universal jurisdiction of the Belgian courts, i.e., ju-
risdiction irrespective of the place of commission and the nationality of the
perpetrator or the victim. The relevant provision reads:
The Belgian Courts shall be competent to deal with breaches provided
for in the present Act, irrespective of where such breaches have been
committed. 18
Thus, a genuine link to Belgium was not required. 19 In addition, the
Act applied to any conflict notwithstanding its character as international or
non-international; otherwise, crimes committed during the Rwandan geno-
cide, having taken place within the framework of a non-international con-
flict, could not have been prosecuted. 70
As to the victim's right to initiate criminal proceedings, it is impor-
tant to note, first of all, the strong position of victims under Belgian proce-
dural law. 21 Each person allegedly injured by an offence may file a com-
plaint and, in case of the prosecutor's decision not to open an investigation,
turn to an examining magistrate (judge d'instruction) as a civil party (partie
civile).22 This procedural situation enables victims to initiate proceedings
17 See Loi du 16 Juin 1993 Relative i ia Rdpression des Infractions Graves aux Conven-
tions Internationales de Genve du 12 aofit 1949 et aux Protocoles I et H du 8 juin 1977,
Additionnels A ces Conventions.
18 The French original reads: "Les jurisdictions beiges sont compdtentes pour connaitre
des infractions prdvues A la prdsente loi, ind6pendamment du lieu oii celles-ci auront d6
commises." See Loi de Juin 1993 Relative A la Repression des Infractions Graves aux Con-
ventions Internationales de Gen6ve du 12 Aofit 1949 et aux Protocoles I et II du 8 Juin 1977
art. 7(1) (Belg).
19 Luc Reydams, Universal Criminal Jurisdiction: The Belgian State of Affairs, 11 CRIM.
L.F. 183, 191 (2000).
20 Linda Keller, Belgian Jury to Decide Case Concerning Rwandan Genocide, ASIL
INSIGHTS, May 2001, available at http-//www.asil.org/insigh72.cfin; Stefaan Smis & Kim
Van der Borght, Belgium: Act Concerning the Punishment of Grave Breaches of Interna-
tional Humanitarian Law, 38 I.L.M. 918, 919 (1999).
21 See generally HENRI-D. BOSLY ET AL., DROIT DE LA PROCtDURE PtNALE 327 (2008)
(describing victims' rights in criminal proceedings).
22 The corresponding Article 63 Code d'Instruction Criminelle reads: "Toute personne qui
se prdtendra ldsde par un crime ou ddlit pourra en rendre plainte et se constituer partie civile
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even if there is no realistic expectation that the suspect will ever enter Bel-
gium territory and can thus be detained by the Belgium authorities. Thus,
the absolute jurisdiction rule, combined with the procedural standing of
victims, leads to what some call-mixing the jurisdictional with the proce-
dural regime-universal jurisdiction in absentia. 23 I will come back to this
24
conceptual error at the end of this paper.
b. Amendments
In 1999 the Act was extended to crimes against humanity and geno-
cide by the Act Concerning the Punishment of Grave Breaches of Interna-
tional Humanitarian Law 25 (the second Act). It adopted, inter alia, the of-
26fence definitions as contained in the ICC Statute. Further, Article 9(3) of
the second Act extended the victim's right to initiate proceedings for of-
fences that fall under the competence of a military court.27 Also, Article
5(3) of the second Act explicitly excluded any immunity attached to the
28official capacity of a person, and on this basis complaints against sitting
Heads of State (e.g., Ariel Sharon, Fidel Castro, Jiang Zemin, George H. W.
Bush) have been filed.29
devant le juge d'instruction comp6tent." See also Luc REYDAMS, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION:
INTERNATIONAL AND MUNICIPAL LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 108 (2003).
23 See Smis & Van der Borght, supra note 20, at 920; Reydams, supra note 19, at 190-91.
24 See infra note 230 and accompanying text.
25 Loi relative d la r-pression des violations graves de droit international humanitaire
(Moniteur Beige 23.03.09) (Belg.); translated in Smis & Van der Borght, supra note 20, at
921.
26 Article 1(2) of the second Act reads:
Conform~ment au Statut de la Cour p~nale internationale, le crime contre
l'humanit6 s'entend de l'un des actes ci-apr~s commis dans le cadre d'une attaque
gtndralisde ou systtmatique lanc~e contre une population civile et en connaissance
de cette attaque.
See Loi Relative A la Rdpression des Violations Graves de droit International Humanitaire
(Moniteur Belge 23.03.09) (Belg.) art. 1(2).
27 Article 9(3) states:
Lorsqu'une infraction prdvue A la prdsente loi ressortit A la comptence de la juri-
diction militaire, l'action publique est mise en mouvement soit par la citation de
l'inculpd par le minist~re public devant lajuridiction de jugement soit par la plainte
de toute personne qui se pr~tendra lsde par l'infraction et qui se sera constitute
partie civile devant le prdsident de la commission judiciaire au siege du Conseil de
guerre dans les conditions prdvues A l'article 66 du Code d'instruction criminelle.
Id. art. 9(3).
28 Article 5(3) reads: "L'immunit6 attache A la qualit6 officielle d'une personne
n'empche pas ]'application de la prdsente loi." Id. art. 5(3).
29 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, VOL. 18, NO. 5(D), UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION IN EUROPE-
THE STATE OF THE ART 37 (2006) [hereinafter HRW]; Stefaan Smis & Kim Van der Borght,
410 [Vol. 42:405
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More important jurisdictional changes took place in April 2003.30
Belgium came under increasing diplomatic pressure because of the high
number of complaints against foreign Heads of State and Ministers such as
Donald Rumsfeld. In addition, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) de-
cided in its Arrest Warrant case that a Belgium arrest warrant against the
incumbent Congolese foreign minister was illegal for violating the rules of
state immunity ratione personae under international law.31 The Belgian
Court of Cassation followed implicitly this verdict in February 2003 in
Abbas Hijazi v. Sharon, finding that the second Act could not exclude im-
munities under international law.32 Thus, two months later, Article 5(3) was
amended to the effect that immunities, while not applicable in principle,
govern the application of the Act in accordance with the "limits established
under international law.",
33
On the other hand, the rule on universal jurisdiction under Article 7
was limited, providing for an explicit prosecution request (requisition) of
the Federal Prosecutor (Parquet F&dra[) if:
1. the violation was not committed on Belgian territory
2. the alleged offender is not Belgian
3. the alleged offender is not located within Belgian territory [and]
Introductory Note to Belgium's Amendment to the Law on June 16, 1993 (as Amended by the
Law of February 10, 1999) Concerning the Punishment of Grave Breaches of Humanitarian
Law, 42 I.L.M. 740, 742-43 (2003); REYDAMS, supra note 22, at 107 (explaining the conflict
of this provision with absolute immunity of the King and partial immunity of Belgian minis-
ters during their time of office). Luc Reydams, Belgium Reneges on Universality: The 5
August 2003 Act on Grave Breaches of International Humanitarian Law, 1 J. INT'L CRIM.
JUST. 679, 680 (2003).
30 Loi modifiant la loi du 16 juin 1993 relative A la r6pression des violations graves du
droit international humanitaire et l'article 144ter du Code judiciaire (Moniteur Belge 07.
05.2003)(Belg.); translated in Belgium Amendment to the Law of June 15, 1993 (As
Amended by yhe Law of February 10, 1999) Concerning the Punishment of Grave Breaches
of Humanitarian Law, 42 LL.M. 749 (2003).
31 Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 70 (Feb. 14, 2005),
available at http'/www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p l=3&p2=3&k=36&case=1 21 &code=
cobe&p3=4.
32 Hijazi v. Sharon, Cour de Cassation, (Feb, 12, 2003) (Belg.), available at www.cass.be/
juris/jucf.htm. On this judgment, see Antonio Cassese, The Belgian Court of Cassation v. the
International Court of Justice: The Sharon and Others Case, 1 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 437
(2003).
33 The (new) Article 5(3) reads: "L' immunitd internationale attach6e A la qualitd officielle
d'une personne n'empeche l'application de la prdsente loi que dans les limites tablies par le
droit international." Loi Modifiant la loi du 16 Juin 1993 Relative A la Repression des Viola-
tions Graves du Droit International Humnaitaire et l'article 144ter du Code Judicaire (1),
art.4(3) (Moniteur Belge 07.05.2003) (emphasis added). An unofficial English translation is
available at 42 I.L.M. 749 (2003).
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4. the victim is not Belgian or has not resided in Belgium for at least three
34years.
Thus, the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction was made depend-
ant on a Federal Prosecutor's decision to act. 35 He was not obliged to act if
the complaint appeared unfounded or if an international court or another
court with a certain link to the offence offered a fair, independent, and more
effective avenue to justice---the forum conveniens doctrine.36 While the
victims could appeal the prosecutor's decision not to act, 37 their ability to
initiate proceedings in cases without any link to Belgium, i.e., true universal
jurisdiction cases, was practically abolished since the investigating judge
was now prevented from acting solely on the basis of a complaint by a par-
34 See Unofficial English Translation, supra note 33, 755. The French original reads:
L'action publique ne pourra toutefois 8tre engagde que sur requisition du procureur
f~dral lorsque:
10 l'infraction n'a pas dtd commise sur le territoire du Royaume;
2' l'auteur prdsumd n'est pas beige;
30 l'auteur prdsumd ne se trouve pas sur le territoire du Royaume et
40 la victime n'est pas beige ou ne rdside pas en Belgique depuis au moins
trios ans.
See Moniteur Beige, supra note 33, 24851.
35 See also Antonio Cassese, Is the Bell Tolling for Universality? A Plea for a Sensible
Notion of Universal Jurisdiction, 1 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 589 (2003).
36 Article 7(1) reads:
Saisi d'une plainte [...] le procureur f6ddral requiert du juge d'instruction qu'il in-
struise cette plainte, sauf si:
10 la plainte est manifestement non fondde ou
20 les faits relevds dans la plainte ne correspondent pas A une qualification de
la prdsente loi; ou
30 une action publique recevable ne peut rdsulter de cette plainte, ou
40 des circonstances concretes de l'affaire, il resort que, dans l'intdrt d'une
bonne administration de la justice et dans le respect des obligations interna-
tionales de la Belgique, cette affaire devrait 8tre portde soit devant les juridic-
tions intrnationales, soit devant la juridiction du lieu ofi les faits ont W com-
mis, soit devant j a juridiction de l'Etat don't l'auteur est ressortissant ou celle
du lieu oft il peut etre trouvd, et pour autant que cette juridiction est
comp6tente, inddpendante, impartial et dquitable.
See Moniteur Beige, supra note 33, 24851.
37 See Article 7(1): "La partie plaignante peut introduire un recours contre la
decisi6n.... "Id.
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tie civil.38 Thus, the possibility of private petitioners to go "venue shopping"
was severely restricted.39
In August 2003, Belgium abolished the second Act Concerning the
Punishment of Grave Breaches of International Humanitarian Law and in-
corporated its norms into the Criminal Code and the Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure (CCP). On the one hand, the three ICC core crimes have been incor-
porated into the Criminal Code.40 On the other hand, the immunity provision
was inserted into Article Ibis of the CCP recognizing immunity on the basis
of international law or binding treaty law and for persons invited to stay in
Belgium either by Belgian authorities or "by an international organization
established in Belgium and with which Belgium has concluded a headquar-
ters agreement.",41 In particular, the latter part of the provision is said to be a
consequence of the U.S. threats to have the NATO headquarters removed
from Brussels if Belgium does not restrict its (universal) jurisdiction.42
As to the exercise of jurisdiction, the decisions concerning cases
with no link to Belgium (CCP Article 12bis) or when the victim was Bel-
gian or had been living in Belgium for at least three years (CCP Article
10(1)bis) now lie exclusively in the domain of the federal prosecutor whose
decision cannot be appealed. Articles l0(l)bis and l2bis of the CCP have
insofar an identical wording which states,
38 On the establishment of "certain filters" concerning civil petitioners, see Damien Van-
dermeersch, Prosecuting International Crimes in Belgium, 3 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 400, 402
(2005).
39 See Reydams, supra note 29, at 687.
40 See PENAL CODE, supra note 16, art. 136. See also Loi Relative aux Violations Graves
du Droit International Humanitaire (1), arts. 6-12 (Moniteur Beige 07.08.2003) (Belg),
translated in 42 I.L.M. 1258 (2003) (unofficial english translation).
41 See Unofficial English Translation supra note 40, 1265-66. The original Article Ibis
reads:
(1) Conform~ment au droit international, les poursuites sont exclues A l'Fdgard: -
des chefs d'Etat, chefs de gouvernement et ministres des Affaires dtrang6res
6trangers, pendant la pdriode oii ils exercent leur fonction, ainsi que des autres
personnes dont l'immunitd est reconnue par le droit international; - des personnes
qui disposent d'une immunit6, totale ou partielle, fondde sur un trait6 qui lie la
Belgique.
(2) Conform~ment au droit international, nul acte de contrainte relatif A l'exercice
de l'action publique ne peut 6tre posd pendant la durde de leur sdjour, A l'encontre
de toute personne ayant 6td officiellement invitde A s6joumer sur le territoire du
Royaume par les autoritds belges ou par une organisation internationale dtablie en
Belgique et avec laquelle la Belgique a conclu un accord de siege.
Code de Procedure Penale art. 1 (Belg.), available at http://www.ejustice.just.fgov.
be/cgiloi/loial .pl?language--fr&la=F&cn=1878041701 &table_name=loi&&caller=list&F
&fromtab=loi&tri=dd+AS+RANK&rech= &numero=l &sql=(text+contains+(%27%27))#L
NK0003 (last visited Nov. 13, 2009).
42 Reydarns, supra note 29, at 685.
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Prosecution.. . may only be undertaken at the request of the Federal Pros-
ecutor, who shall evaluate any complaints and whose decision may not be
appealed. 
43
The last part of the provision--as to the lack of a remedy against
the Prosecutor's decision-was declared unconstitutional in 200544 and thus
amended by a law in 2006 which no longer excludes an appeal.4 5 Also,
while originally the prosecutor only had to notify the Ministry of Justice of
his decision, the 2006 law provides for the notification of the Court of Ap-
peals if the prosecutor declines to proceed with a complaint. 46 In any case,
the possibility of a civil party triggering an investigation autonomously no
longer exists.
Furthermore, the forum conveniens doctrine of April 2003 has been
confirmed; the prosecutor may not proceed with a complaint if (1) it is
clearly without merit; (2) the facts alleged in the complaint do not constitute
a criminal offence; (3) there is no Belgian jurisdiction; or (4) if a more con-
venient forum with an independent, impartial and fair court is available. 47 It
43 Unofficial English Translation, supra note 40, 1266. The French original reads: "Les
poursuites... ne peuvent tre engagdes qu'A la requite du procureur fodral qui appr~cie les
plaintes 6ventuelles. I1 n'y a pas de voie de recours contre cette decision."
44 La Cour d'Arbitrage, Judgment nr. 62/2005, numdro du r6le 2914, B.9 (Mar. 23,
2005), available at http://www.arbitrage.be.
45 See Moniteur Beige 07/07/2006 at 34135 (Belg.) ("Loi du 22 mai 2006 modiant ce r-
taines dispositions de la loi du 17 avril 1878 contenant le Titre prdliminaire du Code de pro-
cedure p6nale, ainsi qu'une disposition de la loi du 5 aofit 2003 relative aux violations graves
de droit international humanitaire"). Article l0(lbis) now reads: "Les poursuites, en ce com-
pris l'instruction, ne peuvent 8tre engag6es qu'A la requite du procureur fdral qui appr~cie
les plaintes dventuelles." Code de Procedure Penale, supra note 41, art. 10(lbis) (Belg.).
46 Code de Procedure Penale, supra note 41, art. 10(lbis)(Belg.)
47 See id. art. 10 (Ibis), art. 12bis. These provisions read:
Saisi d'une plainte en application des alindas prdcddents, le procureur fdral re-
quiert lejuge d'instruction d'instruire cette plainte saufsi:
10 la plainte est manifestement non fond~e; ou
20 les faits relev~s dans la plainte ne correspondent pas A une qualification des
infractions vis~es au livre II, titre Ibis, du Code penal; ou
30 une action publique recevable ne peut rdsulter de cette plainte; ou
40 des circonstances concretes de l'affaire, il ressort que, dans l'int&dt d'une
bonne administration de la justice et dans le respect des obligations interna-
tionales de la Belgique, cette affaire devrait Wtre port~e soit devant les juridic-
tions internationales, soit devant la juridiction du lieu oil les faits ont t6
commis, soit devant la juridiction de l'Etat dont l'auteur est ressortissant ou
celle du lieu ofi il peut 8tre trouvd, et pour autant que cette juridiction pr~sente
les qualitds d'inddpendance, d'impartialitd et d'6quit6, tel que cela peut no-
tamment ressortir des engagements internationaux relevants liant la Belgique
et cet Etat.
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is important to note that the new law contains a transitional clause according
48to which pending cases could be continued under certain circumstances.
It has been argued that these new restrictions of August 2003 were
the result of continued criticism by certain countries which urged Belgium
to restrict its jurisdiction even further, especially after a complaint was filed
in May 2003 against U.S. General Thomas Franks for alleged war crimes in
Iraq.49 Be that as it may, the fact of the matter is that the once broad univer-
sal jurisdiction regime of Belgium has practically been abolished with this
new legislation; instead, traditional jurisdictional principles and the idea of
subsidiarity, also contained in the forum conveniens doctrine, won the
day.50 Interestingly enough, as to the traditional principles the law of Au-
gust 2003 extended the active and passive personality principles to persons,
either alleged perpetrators or victims, who have had their principle resi-
dence in Belgium for at least three years. There is a difference in determin-
ing three years between perpetrators (active personality) and victims (pas-
sive personality): The victims should have been residents at least three years
before the commission of the crime,51 whereas in the case of the perpetra-
48 See Cour d'Arbitrage Extrait de l'arrt no 104/2006 du 21 Juin 2006 art. 29(3) (Moni-
teur Beige 12/07/2006) (BeIg.). The corresponding Article 29(3) reads:
Les affaires pendantes i l'information A la date d'entrde en vigueur de la prdsente
loi et portant sur des infractions visas au titre Ibis, du livre II, du Code penal sont
classdes sans suite par le procureur frdrral dans les trente jours de l'entrde en vi-
gueur de la prdsente loi lorsqu'elles ne rencontrent pas les critrres visrs aux ar-
ticles 6, lbis, 10, lbis et 12bis du titre prdliminaire du Code de procddure prnale.
Les affaires pendantes d l'instruction A la date d'entrde en vigueur de la prdsente loi
et portant sur des faits visds au titre Ibis, du livre II, du Code penal, sont transfdres
par le procureur f~ddral au procureur grnrral prrs la Cour de cassation enddans les
trente jours apr~s la date d'entrre en vigueur de la prdsente loi, A l'exception des
affaires ayant fait l'objet d'un acte d'instruction A ]a date d'entrre en vigueur de la
prrsente loi, ds lors que, soit au moins un plaignant dtait de nationalitd beige au
moment de l'engagement initial de l'action publique, soit au moins un auteur
presum6 a sa residence principale en Belgique, A la date d'entrre en vigueur de la
prrsente loi....
Pour les affaires qui ne sont pas classdes sans suite sur base de l'alinra ler, du § 3,
du present article ou dont le dessaisissement n'est pas prononc6 sur base du
prrcodent alinda, les juridictions belges restent comp6tentes.
Id.
49 Vandermeersch, supra note 38, at 402; Kaleck, supra note 15, at 934. See also Human
Rights Watch, Belgium: Universal Jurisdiction Law Repealed, Aug. 1, 2003, http://www.
hrw.org/en/news/2003/08/01/belgium-universal-jurisdiction-law-repealed (last visited Nov.
13, 2009).
50 Cedric Ryngaert, Applying the Rome Statutes Complementarity Principle: Drawing
Lessons from the Prosecution of Core Crimes by States Acting under the Universality Prin-
ciple, 19 CRiM. L.F. 153, 170 (2008).
51 Article 10(lbis) as to passive personality reads: "[C]ommise contre une personne qui,
au moment des faits, est un ressortissant belge ou une personne qui, depuis au moins trois
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tors jurisdiction may even exist if residence has been acquired after com-
mission of the crime.2
2. Practice
Despite the increasingly restrictive legislation and policy, Belgium
still maintains a special police unit to investigate and prosecute international
crimes already created in 1998. 53 While there exists no special unit on the
level of the federal prosecution and investigative judges, the Belgian justice
system has gained considerable experience in prosecuting international
crimes and still is one of the most active jurisdictions. 54 Because of the co-
lonial ties between Belgium and Rwanda, many Rwandans fled to Belgium
after the beginning of the genocide in 1994.55 Several complaints were filed
by relatives of Belgian and Rwandan victims in order to have the perpetra-
tors prosecuted under the 1993 Act. 56 After some initial difficulties,57 the
Belgian authorities started investigating and, in 2001, convicted four Rwan-
dans in the first war crimes trial. The "Butare Four" were found to be guilty
of violations of common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and Article
4(2)(a) of the Additional Protocol 11.58 There was no forum (non) conve-
niens problem in this trial. Since both the alleged perpetrators and victims
were present in Belgium territory, the ICTR declined to take over the case
and Rwanda collaborated with the Belgian officials. 59 To avoid a problem
with the principle of legality (prohibition of retroactivity), crimes against
ans, sjourne effectivement, habituellement et idgalement en Belgique." Code de Procedure
Penale, supra note 41, art. 10( Ibis).
52 CCP Articles 6 and 7 as to active personality read: "[T]out Beige ou toute personne
ayant sa rdsidence principale sur le territoire du Royaume." For Article 6 to apply, it is ne-
cessary that one of the listed crimes be committed (inter alia violations of International Hu-
manitarian Law). Article 7 only applies in a case of double incrimination; according to Ar-
ticle 7(2), if the crime was committed against a foreigner then the prosecution may only
occur at the request of the federal prosecutor and only if, additionally, the prosecution was
preceded by a complaint of the victim or his family or by a formal notice from the authorities
of the place of commission to the Belgian authorities.
53 HRW, supra note 29, at 11, 40.
54 See Kaleck, supra note 15, at 935; HRW, supra note 29, at 11.
55 See Vandermeersch, supra note 38, at 403.
56 See id at 403-04.
57 For a discussion, see REYDAMS, supra note 22, at 110.
58 Public Prosecutor v. the Butare Four (Assize Court of Brussles, June 8, 2001) (Belg.),
available at http://jure.juridat.just.fgov.be/?lang=fr.
59 REYDAMS, supra note 22, at 112; Luc Reydams, Belgium's First Application of Univer-
sal Jurisdiction: The Butare Four Case, I J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 428, 434 (2003).
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humanity only incorporated into Belgian law by the 1999 Act have not been
charged.6°
An exceptional case is that of Hissbne Habrg, the former Chadian
dictator who is accused of genocide, political murder, and crimes against
humanity committed by his government in the 1980s. In 2000, victims filed
a criminal complaint against Habrd in Belgium on the basis of universal
jurisdiction6' and Chad waived Habrd's immunity in 2002.62 Although Bel-
gium repealed the law under which the complaints were filed in April and
August 2003 respectively, the case could nevertheless go forward because
of the August 2003 Act's transitional clause quoted above. In 2005, Bel-
gium issued an arrest warrant and requested Senegal, where Habr6 is under
house arrest, to extradite him. 63 After several changes in its domestic law
and consultations with the African Union, Senegal decided to prosecute
Habr6 itself. 64 The president of Senegal, however, stated that the trial could
not commence until his country received international funding because
Senegal was not willing to bear the costs of Habrd's trial.65 Faced with
Senegal's inaction, Belgium asked the ICJ on February 19, 2009 to order
Senegal to prosecute or extradite Mr. Habr6. 66 Belgium also asked the Court
for provisional measures to order Senegal not to allow Habr6 to leave Sene-
gal pending the court's judgment on the merits. 67 The Court, however, de-
clined the necessity of provisional measures. Belgium's memorial is sched-
uled for July 2010.68
60 Reydams, supra note 59, at 432. See also Keller, supra note 20; Kaleck, supra note 15,
at 935-36.
61 See Human Rights Watch, Chronology of the Habrd Case, httpJ/www.hrw.org/en/news/
2009/02/12/chronology-habr-case (last visited Nov. 13, 2009).
62 On the question of immunity ratione materiae concerning Habrd, see Paola Gaeta,
Ratione Materiae Immunities of Former Heads of State and International Crimes: The
Hissbne Habr Case, 1 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 186 (2003).
63 Human Rights Watch, supra note 61.
64 Id.
65 See Human Rights Watch, African Union: Press Senegal on Habr , Jan. 28, 2009,
httpJ/www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/01/28/African-union-press-senegal-habr-trial?.
66 Press Release, Int'l Court of Justice, Belgium Institutes Proceedings Against Senegal
and Requests the Court to Indicate Provisional Measures (Feb. 19, 2009), available at
http'J/www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/144/15052.pdf.
67 Id.
68 Press Release, Int'l Court of Justice, Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute
or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal), Fixing of Time-Limits for the Filing of the Initial Plead-
ings (July 17, 2009), available at httpJ/www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/144/15343.pdf. All
relevant documents for the Belgium v. Senegal case are available at http'J/www.icj-cij.org/
docket/index.php (follow "Contentious Cases" hyperlink; then follow "2009: Questions
relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal)" hyperlink).
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B. Germany
1. Introduction
The former German government opted for a full-fledged and auto-
nomous implementation of the ICC Statute into domestic law. Apart from
the actual ICC Statute Act of December 7, 2000 69 -as the formal constitu-
tional precondition for the ratification of the ICC Statute--and a reform of
the constitutional ban on the extradition of nationals with a view to interna-
tional criminal tribunals and member states of the EU,70 two comprehensive
laws covering the substantive and the procedural side of this implementa-
tion have been approved with an overwhelming majority across the political
spectrum in both houses of parliament (Bundestag and Bundesrat). The
substantive law is the Code of Crimes Against International Law (Vdlker-
strafgesetzbuch, "VStGB" (CCAIL)) 71 of June 26, 2002 which-apart from
a few rules on the General Part--provides for an unlimited principle of uni-
versal jurisdiction, to be discussed in detail below, and incorporates the
crimes of Articles 5 through 8 of the ICC Statute into domestic law. The
CCAIL entered into force on July 1, 2002, the same day as the ICC Statute.
It has been the object of extensive academic debate7 2 and has so far been
69 BUNDESGESETZBLATT, Teil II (2000) at 1393 [FEDERAL OFFICIAL GAZETTE, hereinafter
BGBL 2000.]; official draft in Bundestag Doc. 14/2682.
70 See GRUNDGESETZ [Constitution] art. 16.
71 BUNDESGESETZBLATr, Teil 1 (2002) at 2254 [hereinafter BGBL 2002]. The travaux can
be found in BUNDESMINISTERIUM DER JUSTIZ, ARBEITSENTWURF EINES GESETZES ZUR
EINFOHRUNG DES VSTGB (2001); MATERIALIEN ZUM VSTGB (Sascha Rolf Lider & Thomas
Vormbaum eds. 2003) [hereinafter Luider & Vormbaum].
72 Cf Steffen Wirth & Jan C. Harder, Die Anpassung des Deutschen Rechts an das
Rdmische Statut des Internationalen Strafgerichtshofs aus Sicht Deutscher Nichtregierung-
sorganisationen, 33 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR RECHTSPOLITIK 144, 146 (2000); Gerhard Werle,
Vlkerstrafrecht und Geltendes Deutsches Strafrecht, 55 JURISTENZEITUNG 755 (2000);
Gerhard Werle, Konturen eines Deutschen Vlkerstrafrechts, 56 JURISTENZEITUNG 885
(2001); Gerhard Werle & Florian JeBberger, Das Vdlkerstrafgesetzbuch, 57
JURISTENZEITUNG 725 (2002); Gerhard Werle & Florian JeBberger, International Criminal
Justice is Coming Home: The New German Code of Crimes Against International Law, 13
CiuM. L.F. 191 (2002); CLAUS KREI, VOM NUTZEN EINES DEUTSCHEN
VOLKERSTRAFGESETZBUCHS (2000); Claus KreB, Vdlkerstrafrecht in Deutschland, 20 NEUE
ZEITSCHRIFT FOR STRAFRECHT 617, 619 (2000); Andreas Zimmermann, Bestrafung V6lker-
rechtlicher Verbrechen Durch Deutsche Gericht Nach In-Kraft-Treten des Vlkerstrafge-
setzbuchs, 55 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHmIFT 3068 (2002); Andreas Zimmermann, Auf
dem Weg zu einem Deutschen V6lkerstrafgesetzbuch-Entstehung, V6lkerrechtlicher Rah-
men und Wesentliche Inhalte, 35 ZEITSCRIMFT FOR RECHTSPOLITIK 97 (2002); Helmut
Kreicker, Deutschland, in NATIONALE STRAFVERFOLGUNG VOLKERRECHTLICHER
VERBRECHEN. NATIONAL PROSECUTION OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 58 (Albin Eser & Helmut
Kreicker eds., 2003); Steffen Wirth, Germany's New International Crimes Code: Bringing a
Case to Court, I J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 151 (2003); Stefano Manacorda & Gerhard Werle,
L 'adaptation des Syst~mes PNnaux Nationaux au Status de Rome, Le Paradigme du Vdlker-
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translated into eight languages (all U.N. languages-Arabic, Chinese, Eng-
lish, French, Russian, Spanish-as well as Greek and Portuguese).73 The
procedural or cooperation law is the ICC Implementation Act (Gesetz zur
Ausfiihrung des Rdmischen Statuts des Internationalen Strafgerichtshofs
(IStGH-AusfiihrungsG)) of June 21, 2002.74 This law is a so-called "Arti-
kelgesetz," i.e., a law that consists of various articles which either create
autonomous laws in it or reform other laws. In fact, it contains thirteen ar-
ticles, the most important of which is Article 1 which contains the actual
ICC Cooperation Law (Gesetz fiber die Zusammenarbeit mit dem Interna-
tionalen Strafgerichtshof (IStGHG)) 75 and which in turn consists of seven-
ty-three sections or paragraphs. This cooperation law, including the mo-
tives, was translated into English, Arabic, French, Russian and Spanish. 76
It is important to note that both laws-the CCAIL as well as the
Implementation Act-are autonomous laws that, in principle, can be unders-
tood and applied on their own without references to other laws. This is es-
strafgesetzbuch Allemand, 1 REVUE DE SCIENCE CRIMINELLE ET DE DROIT PENAL COMPARE 501
(2003); Thomas Weigend, Das Vdlkerstrafgesetzbuch-Nationale Kodifikation Internationa-
len Rechts, in GEDACHTNISSCHRIFT FOR TH o VOGLER 197, 201 (Otto Triffierer ed., 2004);
Hansj6rg Geiger, 0 Tribunal Penal Internacional e os Aspectos do Novo C6digo Penal
Internacional Alemdo, in TRIBUNAL PENAL INTERNACIONAL 61, 77 (Pablo Rodrigo Alflen da
Silva ed., 2004); Marc Engelhart, Der Weg zum Volkerstrafgesetzbuch-Eine Kurze Ge-
schichte des VIkerstrafrechts, 26 JURA. 734, 742 (2004); Albin Eser, Das Rom-Statut des
Internationalen Strafgerichtshofs als Herausforderung fir die Nationale Strafrechtspflege:
Exemplifiziert an der Implementierung in das Deutsche Recht, in FESTSCHRIFT FOR MANFRED
BURGSTALLER ZUM 65 GEBURTSTAG 355-73, 369 (Christian Grafl & Ursula Medigovic eds.,
2004); JAN HOBNER, DAS VERBRECHEN DES VOLKERMORDS iM NATIONALEN UND
INTERNATIONALEN RECHT 302 (2004); Christoph Safferling, Germany's Adoption of an In-
ternational Criminal Code, in 1 ANNUAL OF GERMAN & EUROPEAN LAW 365 (Russell A.
Miller & Peer Zumbansen eds., 2003); Helmut Satzger, Das Neue Vdlkerstrafgesetzbuch, 22
NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FOR STRAFRECHT 125 (2002); Frank Dietmeier, V6lkerstrafrecht und
Deutsche Gesetzgeber-kritische Anmerkung zum Projekt eines Deutschen "Vdlkerstrafge-
setzbuches ", in GEDACHTNISSCHRIFT FOR DIETER MEURER 333 (Eva Graul & Gerhard Wolf
eds., 2002).
73 See the translations of the German law on Cooperation with the ICC at
www.department-ambos.unigoettingen.de/index.php?option=comcontent&view-article&
id=351 &Itemid=179 (last visited Nov. 13, 2009).
74 BGBL. 2002, supra note 71, 2144. Thereto MacLean, Gesetzentwurf Uber die Zusam-
menarbeit mit dem IStGH, 35 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR RECHTSPOLITIK 261 (2002); J6rg MeiBner,
Das Gesetz zur Ausfithrung des Rdmischen Status des IStGH, 56 NEUE JUSTIZ 347 (2002);
Peter Wilkitzki, The German Law on Co-operation with the ICC, 2 INT'L CRIM. L. R. 197
(2002); Weigend, supra note 72, at 199.
75 The rules governing cooperation with the ICTY and ICTR can be found in Jugoslawien
Strafgerichtshof Gesetz (JStGHG) and the Ruanda-Strafgerichsthof-Gesetz (RStGHG), in
WOLFGANG SCHOMBURG ET AL., INTERNATIONALE RECHTSHILFE IN STRAFSACHEN 1743-59,
1760-70(2006).
76 See www.department-ambos.uni-goettingen.de/index.php?option comcontent&view=
article&id=351 &Itemid=79.
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pecially true of the ICC Cooperation Law, which provides for a special co-
operation regime with the ICC without making reference to the German Act
on International Assistance in Criminal Matters (Gesetz iiber die Rechtshilfe
in Strafsachen (IRG)). 7 This legislative technique was not accidental but
the result of long discussions within the government with the participation
of experts. The main arguments in favor of an autonomous approach were
the easier application of the laws and their model function.
2. The jurisdictional regime
The traditional German law on jurisdiction (Strafanwendungsrecht)
is contained in sections 3 to 7 of the German Criminal Code (Strafgesetz-
buch (CC)). These norms implement-more or less adequately 78-the in-
ternational principles of jurisdiction, i.e., territoriality with its extension to
ships and aircrafts (sections 3, 4), protection (section 5: "domestic legal
interests"), universal jurisdiction (section 6: "internationally protected legal
interests"), passive and active personality (sections 7(1) and (2) no. 1) and
representation (section 7(2) no. 2). Section 6, the provision on universal
jurisdiction, mixes up a set of highly different offences ranging from "of-
fences involving nuclear energy" (no. 2), attacks on air and maritime traffic
(no. 3), "humane trafficking" (no. 4), "unlawful drug dealing" (no. 5), "dis-
tribution of pornography" (no. 6), "counterfeiting money and securities"
(no. 7), "subsidy fraud" (no. 8) to offences "which on the basis of an inter-
national agreement binding on the Federal Republic of Germany must be
prosecuted even though committed abroad., 79 With the entry into force of
the CCAIL, the jurisdictional regime for international core crimes within the
meaning of Articles 5 to 8 of the ICC Statute (implemented in sections 6 to
12 of the CCAIL) is contained in CCAIL section 1, which provides for an
unlimited ("true") principle of universal jurisdiction:80
77 German Law on Cooperation with the International Criminal Court [IStGHG-ICC
Act] Dec. 10, 1988, pt. 1, § 1, available at http'/www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/en/
Aussenpolitik/.../dl__IStGHG.pdf.
78 For a detailed analysis and criticism, see KAI AMBOS, INTERNATIONALES STRAFRECHT
23, § 3 (2008).
79 See Strafgesetzbuch [StGB] [German Criminal Code] Nov. 13, 1998, Federal Law
Gazette [Bundesgesetzblatt] Teil 1, translated in MICHAEL BOHLANDER, THE GERMAN
CRIMINAL CODE: A MODERN ENGLISH TRANSLATION (2008). The original of § 6 no. 9 reads:
"Taten, die auf Grund eines fir die Bundesrepublik Deutschland verbindlichen zwischens-
taatlichen Abkommens auch dann zu verfolgen sind, wenn sie im Ausland begangen wer-
den." Id.
so Contrary to the qualified or limited principle of universal jurisdiction, in the absolute or
unlimited form the jurisdiction is not attached to certain conditions (e.g., residence). See
AMBOS, supra note 78, at 54, § 3 mn. 95.
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This Act shall apply to all criminal offences [Strafiaten] against interna-
tional law designated under this Act, to serious criminal offences [Verbre-
chen]81 designated therein even when the offence was committed abroad
and bears no relation to Germany.
82
The regulation, using the wording "bears no relation to Germany,"
explicitly revokes 83 the traditional jurisprudence of the Federal Supreme
Court (Bundesgerichtshof (BGH)), which demanded such a domestic link. 84
This broad concept of universal jurisdiction, which was already defended by
the German delegation at the Rome ICC Conference arguing for its inclu-
sion in the ICC Statute,85 finds its rationale in the fundamental interests
protected by international criminal law and the seriousness of international
core crimes trying to prevent the violation of these interests. The protection
of these interests and the prosecution of the respective crimes lie in the in-
terest of humanity 86 and thus cannot be regarded as a domestic issue of the
State where the crime was committed. Consequently, the principle of non-
intervention is not violated. 87 We will return to this normative foundation of
universal jurisdiction in the conclusion of this paper.88
81 In German law the term "serious criminal offence" (Verbrechen) is used to denote crim-
inal offences (Straftaten) that are punishable with not less than one year of imprisonment.
Mitigating (and aggravating) circumstances are to be disregarded. See German Criminal
Code, supra note 79, § 12. The other offences (misdemeanours, Vergehen) do not have a
minimum punishment of one year. In the Code of Crimes Against International Law, all
offences are "serious criminal offences" (Verbrechen) except the "Vergehen" of sections 13
and 14.
82 For the source of the translation, see supra note 73.
83 Cf the travaux in Lilder & Vormbaum, supra note 71, at 26 ("Referentenentwurf' ac-
cording to BR-Drucks. 29/02). Cf Werle, supra note 72, at 890; Werle & JeBberger, supra
note 72, at 729; Zimmermann, supra note 72, at 3069; Member of Parliamente Pick, in
Ldder & Vormbaum, supra note 71, at 80; Brigitte Zypries, in DER ISTGH FONF JAHRE NACH
ROM 11, 14 (Gunnar Theissen & Martin Nagler eds., 2004).
84 See Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Supreme Court], 1 BGs 100/94 (Feb. 13, 1994) in 14
NEUE ZEITSCHR!FT FOR STRAFRECHT 232, 233 (1994); Bundesgerichtshof, 2 ARs 499-98
(Dec. 11, 1998), in 19 NEUE ZEITSCRrFT FOR SR.REcTrr 236 (1999); Bundesgerichtshof, 2
ARs 51/99 2 AR 199/98 (Feb. 11, 1999), in 19 STRAFVERTEIDIGER 240 (1999); Bundesge-
richtshof, 4 StR 19/99 (Apr. 22, 1999), in 45 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESGERICHTSHOFS IN
STRAFSACHEN 64, 65, 68 (1999), though clearly for war crimes (at 69). See also for case-law
Kai Ambos, § 6 Auslandstaten gegen international geschiitzte Rechtsgiiter, in MONCHNER
KOMMENTAR STRAFGESETZBUCH §§ 1-51, 177, 178 § 6 mn. 1, 4 (Wolfgang Joecks et al. eds.,
2003).
85 The author was member of the German delegation. In the end, the German position did
not prevail: Article 12 ICC-Statute rather provides for the principles of territoriality and
active personality (for more on this, see AMBOS, supra note 78, at 287, § 8 mn. 7).
86 See motives in Lilder & Vormbaum, supra note 71, at 26.
87 Critique however Oberlandesgericht [Higher Regional Court] Stuttgart, 5 Ws 109/05
(Sep. 13, 2005), reprinted in 26 NEUE ZErrSCHRitT FOR STRAFRECrr 117, 119 (2006)
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There exist, however, political and practical concerns which, in the
German case, have been especially echoed by the Federal Prosecutor Gen-
eral (Generalbundesanwalt (GBA)) already during the drafting process of
the CCML. As a result, the unlimited principle of universal jurisdiction, in
terms of substantive law, has been limited by the procedural norm of section
153f of the Criminal Procedure Code (Strafprozessordnung (CPC)):
(1) In the cases referred to under section 153c subsection (1), numbers 1
and 2, the public prosecution office may dispense with prosecuting an of-
fence punishable pursuant to sections 6 to 14 of the Code of Crimes
against International Law, if the accused [suspect] s 9 is not present in Ger-
many and such presence is not to be anticipated. If in the cases referred to
under section 153c subsection (1), number 1, the accused [suspect] is a
German, this shall however apply only where the offence is being prose-
cuted before an international court or by a state on whose territory the of-
fence was committed or whose national was harmed by the offence.
(2) In the cases referred to under section 153c subsection (1), numbers 1
and 2, the public prosecution office can, in particular, dispense with prose-
cuting an offence punishable pursuant to sections 6 to 14 of the Code of
Crimes against International Law, if
1. there is no suspicion of a German having committed such offence,
2. such offence was not committed against a German,
3. no suspect in respect of such offence is residing in Germany and
such residence is not to be anticipated and
4. the offence is being prosecuted before an international court or by
a state on whose territory the offence was committed, whose national
is suspected of its commission or whose national was harmed by the
offence.
The same shall apply if a foreigner accused of an offence committed
abroad is residing in Germany but the requirements pursuant to the first
sentence, numbers 2 and 4, have been fulfilled and transfer to an interna-
tional court or extradition to the prosecuting state is permissible and is in-
tended.
(3) If in the cases referred to under subsection (1) or (2) public charges
have already been preferred, the public prosecution office may withdraw
[hereinafter OLG Stuttgart]. Note the left column, which sees a "doubtful extension" of
jurisdiction.
88 See infra text accompanying note 217.
89 The provision originally referred mistakenly to the "accused." See Werner Beulke, §
153f, in 5 LOWE-ROSENBERG DIE STRAFPROZEBORDNUNG UND DAS GERICHrS-
VERFASSUNGSGESETZ, 225, 232, § 153fmn. 14 (Volker Erb et al. eds., 2008); Weigend, supra
note 72, at 209 n.49). As this has been correctly changed to "suspect" ("Beschuldigter"), the
author changed the translation accordingly.
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the charges at any stage of the proceedings and terminate the
proceedings.
90
The interplay between CCAIL section 1 and CPC section 153f can
be explained as follows: 9' CCAIL section 1 fits the German criminal prose-
cution of international crimes within an "international criminal justice sys-
tem," which--4o avoid impunity of serious human rights violations-elies
primarily on the territorial/suspect/victim States; second, on the ICC and, if
applicable, other international criminal courts; 92 and third, on third States
exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction on the basis of the principle of univer-
sal jurisdiction.93 This system entails a conditional subsidiarity of the uni-
versal jurisdiction principle which CPC section 153f secures by directing
the Prosecutor's discretion. The overall aim of the provision is to counteract
an alleged overload of the judiciary 94 through so-called "Forum-Shopping"
with regard to international core crimes 95 and to limit criminal proceedings
to "reasonable cases." 96 The conflicting procedural principles of legality
(mandatory prosecution) and opportunity (discretion) are adjusted in accor-
dance with the particularities of international crimes committed abroad as
90 See GERHARD WERLE, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 133, mn. 359,
n.737 (2009) (quoting section 153f).
91 I draw from my earlier paper Kai Ambos, International Core Crimes, Universal Juris-
diction and §153f of the German Criminal Procedure Code: A Commentary on the Decisions
of the Federal Prosecutor General and the Stuttgart Higher Regional Court in the Abu
Ghraib/Rumsfeld Case, 18 CRM. L.F. 43, 43-58 (2007). For a good English analysis of
section 153f, see AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, GERMANY: END IMPUNITY THROUGH UNIVERSAL
JURISDICTION [No SAFE HAVEN SERIES 3] 55 (2008), available at httpJ/www.amnesty.org/
en/library/info/EUR23/003/2008/en.
92 Cf AMBOS, supra note 78, at 116, § 6 mn. 58.
93 Cf id at 30 § 3 mn. 21. See also Rainer Keller, Grenzen, Unabhangigkeit und Subsidia-
ritdt der Weltrechtspflege, 153 GOLTDAMMER'S ARCHIv 25, 34, 37 (2006); Michael E. Kurth,
Zum Verfolgungsermessen des Generalbundesanwaltes Nach § 153f StPO, 1 ZEITSCHRIFT
FOR INTERNATIONALE STRAFRECHTSDOGMATIK 81, 84 (2006), available at http://www.zis-
online.com. For a "flexible" principle of universal jurisdiction, see Hans Vest, Zum Univer-
salititsprinzip bei V6lkerrechtsverbrechen. Bemerkungen de Lege Ferenda, 123
SCHWEIZERISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FOR STRAFRECHT 331 (2005). For primacy of third States over
the ICC, see REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF INQUIRY ON DARFUR TO THE
UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL PURSUANT TO SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1564
OF 18 SEPTEMBER 2004, 616 (2005), available at http://www.un.org/news/dh/
sudan/com inq_darfur.pdf ("[T]he ICC should defer to national courts other than those of
Sudan which genuinely undertake proceedings on the basis of universal jurisdiction."). Com-
pare with Mireille Delmas-Marty, Interactions Between National and International Criminal
Law in the Preliminary Phase of Trial at the ICC, 4 J.INT'L CRIM. JUST. 2, 6 (2006).
94 See motives in Llder & Vormbaum, supra note 71, at 60; Werle, supra note 72, at 890.
95 For an analysis of the danger posed by an arbitrary expansionist choice of jurisdiction,
see Kurth, supra note 93, at 83.
96 Zypries, supra note 83, at 14.
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opposed to the rules for ordinary crimes committed abroad for which CPC
section 153c(1) remains applicable. 97
CPC section 153f refers to all offences of the CCAIL (sections 6
through 14), although only the serious criminal offences (Verbrechen) of
sections 6 through 12 fall under the principle of universal jurisdiction, while
for the less serious misdemeanours (Vergehen) of sections 13 and 14 the
general criminal law 98 remain applicable.99 Insofar one could have left it
with the application of the general rules in CPC section 153c. 10o The discre-
tion as a result of the opportunity principle is structured in two directions,
always taking care of the superior goal of preventing impunity:' 1 In case of
crimes committed abroad with a domestic link-i.e., when the suspect is
present in Germany' °2 and/or when he/she is a German' ° 3-it follows from
the cited rules e contrario that an obligation to prosecute exists in principle;
there could only then be a refrain from prosecuting a German national when
the offence is being prosecuted before an international court or by the terri-
torial or victim State, 104 since in this case the overall goal (to avoid impu-
nity) could also be achieved. 105 If, however, there is no domestic link what-
soever-when a German is neither involved as victim nor as perpetrator, 1
06
and no suspect of such offence is residing in Germany, and such residence
97 This provision gives the prosecutor discretion with regard to the "non-prosecution of
extraterritorial offences," CPC section 153(c)(1) clause 2 provides for the application of
section 153f in case of international crimes. For the travaux, see Lider & Vormbaum, supra
note 71, at 59; KRE, supra note 72, at 625; JeBberger, in Theisen & Nagler, supra note 83, at
48; Beulke, supra note 89, at 218, § 153fmn. 9.
98 See StGB, supra note 79, § 3.
99 For the distinction, see supra note 81.
'0o Cf Edda Welau, §153f [Absehen von der Verfolgung einer Nach VStGB Strafbaren
Tat], in SYSTEMATISCHER KOMMENTAR ZUR STRAFPROZEBORDNUNG LJND ZUM
GERICHTSVERFASSUNGSGESETZ § 153f inn. 5 (Hans-Joachim Rudolphi et al., Apr. 2009).
101 See motives in Lider & Vormbaum, supra note 71, at 60. See also Armin Schoreit, §
153f [Taten nach dem V6lkerstrafgesetzbuch], in KARLSRUHER KOMMENTAR 950-51, § 153f
mn. 2 (Rolf Hannich ec, 2008); Beulke, supra note 89, at 228, § 153f inn. 4.
102 Strafprozefordnung [StPO] [Code of Criminal Procedure] Jun 26, 2002, § 153f(1) cl. 1.
103 Id. § 153f(1) cl. 2.
104 Id.
105 See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text. Section 28 (in conjunction with section
68) of the "IStGHG" supports this argument since there is basically a refrain from prosecut-
ing a German national where there is a (declared) ICC surrender request. See BGBL 2002,
supra note 71, at 2254. Cf Beulke, supra note 89, at 235, § 153f mn. 24; Welflau, supra note
100, § 153f mn. 8. This rule is further evidence of the friendliness of the German legislator
towards the ICC, given that already the mere declaration of intent of the filing of a surrender
request can be enough without any concrete proof an investigation is really being carried out.
106 Strafprozelordnung [StPO] [Code of Criminal Procedure] Jun 26, 2002, § 153f(2) nos.
1,2.
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is not to be anticipated' 07-- the prosecution may in particular ("insbeson-
dere") be dispensed of, if-avoidance of impunity!-an international court
or the territorial/suspect/victim State prosecutes the respective offence(s). 108
The same applies-as an exception to the duty to prosecute crimes accord-
ing to CPC section 153f(1) cl. 1 e contrario--where the foreign suspect of
an offence committed abroad is residing in Germany, but there are no Ger-
man victims to deplore'09 and the suspect's transfer to an international court
or extradition to the prosecuting State 1° is permissible and is intended. I
Besides, it ensues from CPC section 153f(l) cl. 1 in conjunction with
153c(l) no. 1 and 2 that in cases of "purely "foreign offences-with no an-
ticipated residence of the accused--the Federal Prosecutor General could
dispense with prosecuting even when there is no other jurisdiction willing to
prosecute (but see below). 112
Section 153f thus adopts a "jurisdictional hierarchy by stages"
(gestufte Zustdndigkeitsprioritdt)"3 according to which foreign courts with
a close link to the alleged offence and the ICC to a large extent are given
primacy for the cases dealt with in CPC section 153f(2). While, on the one
hand, the wording "may" (instead of "ought to"), 114 inserted by the Legal
Committee (Rechtsausschuss) of the Bundestag, expresses that there should
be "normally""' 5 and, as the case may be, "regularly"'1 6 a refrain in prose-
cuting the mentioned cases, on the other hand the substitution of "ought to,"
which expresses a binding discretionary power, with "may" makes it clear
that a partial withdrawal of universal jurisdiction proper, as recognized in
the substantive law, is neither intended nor is it excluded that the prosecutor
could--despite the existence of nos. 1-4 of subs. 2 of section 153f---make
use of its competence to prosecute. 117 Also, the above-mentioned extensive
discretionary powers in the case of "purely foreign acts" is not to be under-
'07 Seeid § 153f(2) no 3.
108 See id. § 153f(1).
'0o See id. § 153f(2) cl. 2; cl.1 no. 2.
"o See id § 153f (2) cl. 1 no. 4; cl. 2.
. Id. § 153 f(2) cl. 2. Cf the motives in Lider & Vormbaum, supra note 71, at 60.
112 Cf. Lfider & Vormbaum supra note 71, at 61; Weigend, supra note 72, at 209; Schoreit,
supra note 101, at 951, § 153fmn. 3.
113 See motives in Lider & Vormbaum, supra note 71, at 61; Weigend, supra note 72, at
209.
114 For the old wording see the expert draft in BUNDESMINISTERIUM DER JUSTIZ, supra note
71, at 14 and the official government draft (Referentenentwurfi in Lider & Vormbaun,
supra note 71, at 20.
115 Weigend, supra note 72, at 209.
116 Schoreit, supra note 101, at 952, § 153fmn. 7.
117 Cf REPORT OF LEGAL COMMITTEE OF THE BUNDESTAG in hider & Vormbaum, supra
note 71, at 88; Beulke, supra note 89, at 238, § 153fmn. 32.
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stood as a withdrawal from the principle of universal jurisdiction, but it is
rather guided by the purely practical consideration that in such cases crimi-
nal proceedings in Germany would not be very promising. 118 The costs gen-
erated by unnecessary investigations ought to be avoided and only cases
with realistic chances of success ought to be prosecuted. 119 The superior aim
of preventing impunity could, however, even in the case of "purely foreign
acts," lead to a reduction of the discretionary power in favour of the initia-
tion of proceedings in order to support investigation in another country or
by the ICC.12° The reduction of the discretion also follows from the wide
understanding of residence within German territory, as it suffices any (vol-
untary or involuntary) contact with German territory (e.g., temporary stay,
transfer) which would permit detention. '21
3. Critical assessment of the practice
Since the entry into force of the CCAIL until January 3,
2008--more recent data is not available 122--- the Federal Prosecutor has filed
eighty-six "incidents to be observed" (Beobachtungsvorgdnge),123 the ma-
jority of which is based on complaints or communications filed by victims
or NGOs representing victims; a few have been filed de oficio based on
information from generally accessible sources. 2 4 According to recent in-
formation from the Federal Prosecutor, "the number of investigations cur-
rently stands in the low double figures (or digits), with an increasing ten-
118 See motives in Lilder & Vormbaum, supra note 71, at 61; also see Beulke, supra note
89, at 228, § 153f inn. 5; Tobias Singeinstein & Peer Stolle, Volkerstrafrecht und Lega-
litdtsprinzip-Klageerzwingungsverfahren bei Opportunitdtseinstellungen und Auslegung
des § 153fStPO, 1 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR INTERNATIONALE STRAFRECHTSDOGMATIK 120 (2006).
119 See Schoreit, supra note 101, at 951, § 153fmn. 3.
120 On "provisional investigations" or "investigatory help" in connection with CPC §
153f(2), see motives in Lder & Vormbaum, supra note 71, at 61; Weigend, supra note 72,
at 209; Schoreit, supra note 101, at 953, § 153fnm. 9; Beulke, supra note 89, at 240, § 153f
nn. 42; WeBlau, supra note 100, § 153fmn. 11.
121 See motives in BUNDESMINISTERIUM DER JUSTIZ, supra note 71, at 86, Ltider & Vorm-
baum, supra note 71, at 61. See also Beulke, supra note 89, at 232, § 153fmn. 15; WeBlau,
supra note 100, § 153frmn. 9.
122 In an email of Oct. 2, 2008 the Federal Prosecutor informed the author that further in-
formation could not be provided anymore for fear of endangering ongoing investigations.
123 For an explanation, see Justice in the Name of All, Die Praktische Anwendung des
Vdlkerstrafgesetzbuchs aus der Sicht des Generalbundesanwalts Beim Bundesgerichtshof 2
ZEITSCHR1FT FOR INTERNATIONALE STRAFRECHTSDOGMATIK 507, 511 (2007).
124 Letter of the Federal Prosecutor to the Author (Jan. 3, 2008) (on file with author). For
earlier data, see AMBOS, supra note 78, at 480, § 1 mn. 28, n.179; Ambos, supra note 91, at
43. For an overview of some cases, see AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 91, at 101.
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dency."' 125 The complaints target members of the U.S., German, and Israeli
governments; others also target members of governments and heads of
states of various African and Asian States. In most cases, the Federal Prose-
cutor has refrained from initiating a formal investigation invoking CPC sec-
tions 152(2), 153f(1) and (2), either on legal grounds (inter alia, immunity
of the possible suspects, the non-applicability of the CCAIL at the time the
alleged act was committed) or on the lack of any prospects of success. 126
Formal investigations, implying interrogations of suspects and witnesses,
have only been initiated in four cases, none of which have yet led to any
further measures e.g., the request of an arrest warrant or the filing of an ac-
cusation. The Federal Prosecutor and members of her office have, however,
expressed confidence that soon a formal investigation may lead to further
measures. 127 Indeed, at the time of reviewing this paper, two leading mem-
bers of the "Forces Drmocratiques de Libdration du Rwanda" (FDLR), a
paramilitary group accused of crimes against humanity and war crimes
committed in the border area between the Dem. Republic of Congo and
Rwanda, have been arrested in Germany on the basis of an arrest warrant
requested by the Federal Prosecutor. 
1 28
The two complaints against the former U.S. Secretary of State for
Defence Donald Rumsfeld and others alleging the maltreatment of Iraqi
prisoners in the Abu Ghraib prison complex have attracted special atten-
tion. 129 The Federal Prosecutor General dismissed the first complaint in his
decision on February 10, 2005.130 The Stuttgart Higher Regional Court
(Oberlandesgericht (OLG)) declared the motion for a court decision as in-
admissible on September 13, 2005."1 This was the first High Court decision
125 Email to the author of Sept. 7, 2009 ("Die Zahl der vom GBA auf dem Gebiet des
V6lkerstrafrechts gefhrten Ermittlungsverfahren liegt derzeit-mit steigender Tendenz-im
unteren zweistelligen Bereich."). In an email of Oct. 2, 2008 the Federal Prosecutor informed
the author that further, more concrete information could not be provided anymore for fear of
endangering ongoing investigations.
126 StrafprozeBordnung [StPO] [Code of Criminal Procedure] Jun 26, 2002, 153f(1) cl. 1.
127 Conversations of this author with Federal Prosecutors held during the German Speaking
Working Group of International Criminal Law, Lausanne, Switzerland (June 26-27, 2009)
(on file with author); Conversation held with the Federal Prosecutor General, Prof. Dr. Mo-
nika Harms, G6ttingen, Germany (July 10, 2009) (on file with author).
128 See Press Release, GBA, 17 Nov. 2009 - 24/2009 (Nov. 2009), available at www.
generalbundesanwalt.de.
129 See Denis Basak, Abu Ghraib, das Pentagon und die Deutsche Justiz, 18 HUMANITARES
VOLKERRECHT-INFORMATIONSSCHRIFTEN (HuV-I) 85 (2005). For the case of the complai-
nants, see REPUBLIKANISCHER ANWALTINNEN UND ANWALTEVEREIN, STRAFANZEIGE/
RuMSFELD U.A., 26 (2005).
130 See Press Release, GBA, Keine Deutschen Ermittlungen Wegen der Angezeigten
Vorfille von Abu Ghraib/Irak (Feb. 10, 2005).
131 OLG Stuttgart, supra note 87.
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on the application of the complicated regulation of CPC section 153f and,
implicitly, also on the principle of universal jurisdiction contained in
CCAIL section 1. Yet both the decision from the Federal Prosecutor Gen-
eral as well as that from the Higher Regional Court are not convincing. As
has been criticized elsewhere, 132 the decisions neither fully comply with the
legal purpose of CCAIL section 1 or CPC section 153f, nor fully grasp the
interaction of both regulations as explained above.
The second, considerably extended complaint of November 14,
2006 (which included the authors of the torture memos to the list of the sus-
pects) 133 was also rejected by the Federal Prosecutor who invoked clause 1
of section 153f(l). 134 According to the Prosecutor, there must be a realistic
expectation that the person will be present in Germany and can be brought
to trial. Given the national investigators' lack of operational powers in for-
eign territories, an investigation about extraterritorial facts can only produce
relevant information if the territorial state offers effective legal and judicial
assistance. This reasoning has been confirmed by the OLG Stuttgart ar-
guing, inter alia, that there must be a continuing presence of the suspect on
German territory or concrete indicia for his expected presence; such indicia,
to be assessed exclusively by the Prosecutor within his discretion, are lack-
ing if the suspect has no professional, personal, or family connections in
Germany. 135 In fact, with this argumentation the criterion of the territorial
link has been reintroduced through the backdoor, ignoring the clear wording
of CCAIL section 1 and paragraph two of CPC section 153f which shall
guide prosecutorial discretion. 136
The scarce practice since the entry into force of the CCAIL has led
to considerable criticism, in particular from NGOs. 137 On October 24, 2007,
132 Ambos, supra note 91, at 50 with further references. See also Denis Basak, Der Fall
Rumsfeld-Ein Begrdbnis dritter Klasse fur das Vlkerstrafgesetzbuch, 90 KRITISCHE
VIERTELJAHRESCHRIFT FOR GESETZGEBUNG uND RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT [hereinafter KRITV]
333 (2007): Kaleck, supra note 15, at 961.
133 See Kaleck, supra note 15, at 953. See also infra note 220.
134 Press release, GBA, (April 27, 2007), available at www.generalbundesanwalt.de. The
appeal against this decision was finally declared inadmissible by the OLG Stuttgart on April
21, 2009, 5 Ws 21/09.
135 OLG Stuttgart, supra note 87, at 6, 7-8.
136 This is apparently not the view of OLG Stuttgart, id. 9, which argues that the applica-
tion of paragraph 1 cl. 1 excludes the application of paragraph 2.
137 See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 91, at 106 (with recommendations). Regard-
ing the Rumsfeld et al. dismissals, see Press Release, Center for Constitutional Rights, Other
Human Rights Groups Ask German Court to Review Federal Prosecutor's Decision to Dis-
miss Rumsfeld Torture Case (Nov. 13, 2007), available at httpJ/ccrjustice.org/newsroom/
press-releases/ccr/o2C-ther-human-rights-groups-ask-german-court-review-federal-
prosecutor/62526%25230. See also Kaleck, supra note 15, at 953 (discussing the "limited"
approach). For a quite objective description of the practice, see HRW, supra note 29, at 63.
428 [Vol. 42:405
PROSECUTING GUANTANAMO IN EUROPE
the "Committee for Human Rights and Humanitarian Aid" (Ausschuss fir
Menschenrechte und Humanitdre Hilfe) of the German Bundestag held a
public hearing on the national implementation of the CCAIL, and the re-
strictive application of the law by the Federal Prosecutor has received con-
siderable criticism by all invited independent experts. 138 There are concerns
that the Federal Prosecutor's broad interpretation of CPC section 153f en-
tails an unfettered discretion and to a defacto derogation of the principle of
universal jurisdiction through the procedural backdoor. One author warns of
an executive (political) control over the exercise of criminal proceedings. 139
In this respect, the traditional view that prosecutorial decisions to terminate
proceedings on the basis of the opportunity principle 140 are not open to judi-
cial review is not convincing. This view already deserves criticism with
regard to the "traditional" reasons for dismissing a case stated in CPC sec-
tion 153 through 154f,l4 1 but it is even less justifiable in the case of CPC
section 153f, and the alleged inadmissibility of a judicial review should not
be understood as the legislature's conscious decision. 142 As a matter of fact,
the legislature adopted CPC section 153f as a result of the Federal Prosecu-
tor's concerns about the principle of universal jurisdiction in CCAIL section
138 Apart from Senior Federal Prosecutor Rolf Hannich himself, other experts were invited
as follows (in alphabetical order): Professor Dr. Horst Fischer (Universities Bochum and
Leiden), Wolfgang Kalek (Lawyer, Berlin), Judge Hans-Peter Kaul (ICC, The Hague), Pro-
fessor Dr. Claus KreB3 (UniversitAt K6ln), Geraldine Mattioli (Justice Advocate Human
Rights Watch) and this author. All written statements are available at http://
www.bundestag.de/ausschuesse /al7/anhoerungen/voelkerstrafgerichtsho/index.html. For the
most comprehensive brief, see Claus KreB, Stellungnahme Offentliche Anhdrung im
Ausschuss fiir Menschenrechte und Humanitdre Hilfe des Deutschen Bundestages zum The-
ma Nationale Umsetzung des VStGB 24. 10. 2007, 2 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR INTERNATIONALE
STRAFRECHTSDOGMATIK 515 (2007). For a summary, see also AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL,
supra note 91, at 61-62.
139 Wel31au, supra note 100, § 153f mn. 3.
140 See StrafprozeBordnung [StPO] [Code of Criminal Procedure] Jun 26, 2002, §§ 153-
154f, argumentum ex 172(2) cl. 3. Cf Kirsten Graalmann-Scheerer, § 172, in 5 LOWE-
ROSENBERG DIE STRAFPROZEBORDNUNG UND DAS GERICHTSVERFASSUNGSGESETZ, supra note
89, at 896, 911 § 172, inn. 21, 26 with further references.
14 1 For general demands for the control of the legality of discretionary decisions, see § 174a
Alternative Draft Investigation (Altemativentwurf-Ermittlungsverfahren) with further refer-
ences. See also MARKus HORSTMANN, ZUR PRAZISIERUNG UND KONTROLLE VON
OPPORTUNITATSENSTELLUNGEN 308 (2002). For a limited compulsory procedure, see
VOLKER ERB, LEGALITAT UND OPPORTUNITAT 230 (1999); HELMUT SATZGER, CHANCEN UND
RISIKEN EINER REFORM DES STRAFRECHTLICHEN ERMITTLUNGSVERFAHRENS, GUTACHTEN C
ZUM 65: DEUTSCHEN JURISTENTAG C 78 (2004). One must take into account, however, that
the argument of procedural economy shifts, given the gravity of the offences, in favor of the
interests of victims.
142 See OLG Stuttgart, supra note 87, at 118 at the left column: "bewusste gesetzgeberische
Entscheidung" ("conscious legislative decision"). This was confirmed by OLG Stuttgart. See
supra note 134, at 6.
20091
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
1.143 Due to time constraints--the German legislation on the implementa-
tion of the ICC Statute was to come into force no later than the ICC Statute
(July 1, 2002)-the legislature did not dedicate any thought to possible legal
remedies and, in particular, it did not take into account that section 153f
falls under the provisions listed in section 172 (2) cl. 3, the last part of the
CPC.144 It is also due to the speed of the legislation process that CPC sec-
tion 153f does not require judicial consent for the dismissal decision and
that, therefore, judicial control can only occur afterwards. Indeed, this goes
against the system of dismissal provided for in sections 153 through 154f
since judicial consent is, in principle, required; 145 this requirement is only
waived 46 when acts of less gravity are concerned, be they minor misde-
meanours 147 or any other offences committed abroad, 148 or when there are
overwhelming political interests opposing a criminal prosecution. 149 None
of these grounds apply to CPC section 153f. It is neither concerned with
lesser offences-it only concerns the most important international core
crimes-nor should divergent political interests play a role. 15 The only
relevant question is whether-with regard to the overall aim of preventing
impunity--the criminal prosecution could be carried out otherwise, such as
by another State or the ICC. It is also worth noting that even under the cur-
rent law a complaint to compel the criminal investigation or prosecution
(Klage-/Ermittlungserzwingungsverfahren) against a dismissal on the basis
of CPC sections 153f through 154f is admissible with the claim that the
legal requirements for discretion did not exist, i.e., that there was no margin
of discretion and thus the duty to prosecute continued to exist. 151 According
143 The author was a member of the working group appointed by the German Federal Min-
istry of Justice to draft the CCAIL and CPC § 153f.
144 See Strafprozel3ordnung [StPO] [Code of Criminal Procedure] Jun 26, 2002, § 172(2) cl.
3 ("§§ 153c bis 154 Abs. 1"). The OLG Stuttgart, supra note 87, invokes this to support its
position.
145 See Strafproze3ordnung [StPO] [Code of Criminal Procedure] Jun 26, 2002, §§
153(I)(1), 153a(I)(1), 153b, 153e. On the importance of judicial consent in this context, see
Friedrich-Christian Schroeder, Zur Rechtskraft Staatsanwaltschaflicher Einstel-
lungsverflgungen, 16 NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FOR STRAFRECHT 319 (1996). See also ERB, supra
note 141, at 228. Erb correctly points out the low efficiency of the control by judicial con-
sent. Id. at 224.
146 See Strafproze13ordnung [StPO] [Code of Criminal Procedure Civil Code], Apr. 7, 1987,
§§ 153(2), 153a(I)(7), 153c, (d).
147 See id §§ 153(2), 153a.
148 Seeid § 153c.
141 Seeid. § 153c L, IV, § 153d.
150 On these demands, see Weigend, supra note 72, at 209; Kreicker, supra note 72, at 434;
rather critically, Kurth, supra note 93, at 86.
151 Peter RieB, § 172, in 2 LowE-ROSENBERG DIE STRAFPROZEI3ORDNUNG UND DAS
GERICHTS-VERFASSUNGSGESETZ, § 172 mn. 26 (Peter Rie ed., 1989); Graalmann-Scheerer,
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to the case law of the higher courts, a claim for judicial review is admissible
when an initial suspicion, on legal grounds, must be rejected and, therefore
an investigation on the facts of the case has been omitted. 152 Thus, an en-
forcement action in order to secure the principle of legality could be used
even in the case of CPC sections 153 through 154f, for it does not make a
difference if investigations were already carried out 153 and a right of review
has arisen, 154 or if they were omitted from the very beginning. 155 These con-
siderations apply afortiori to CPC section 153f, for this rule provides for a
double exception to the universal jurisdiction principle and the principle of
legality for offences which entail--beyond the national duty to prose-
cute l56--an international duty to prosecute and punish. 157 This means that
supra note 140, at 911 § 172 mn. 22, 26; Wolfgang Wohlers, § 172 [Klageerzwingungsver-
fahren], in SYSTEMATISCHER KOMMENTAR ZUR STRAFPROZEBORDNUNG UND ZUM
GERICHTSVERFASSUNGSGESETZ § 172 mn. 38 (Hans-Joachim Rudolphi et al., Apr. 2009);
Johann Pl6d, § 172 [Beschwerderecht des Verletzten, Antrag auf Gerichtliche Entschei-
dung], in 2 KOMMENTAR ZUR STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG § 172 inn. 15 (H. Miiller et al. eds.,
July 2009); Christoph Krehl, § 172 [Klageerzwingungsverfahren], in HEIDELBERGER
KOMMENTAR ZUR STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG, 671, 673, § 172 mn. 7 (Michael Lemke et al. eds.,
2001). See also Karl-Heinz Schmid, § 172 [Klageerzwingungsverfahren], in KARLSRUHER
KOMMENTAR 1123, 1133, § 172 inn. 41 (Rolf Hannich ed., 2008); LUTZ MEYER-GOONER,
STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG 778, § 172 mn. 3 et seq. (2006). For an inquiry into the legal ele-
ments of the dismissal rules through interpretation, see Singelnstein & Stolle, supra note 118,
at 118; HORSTMANN, supra note 141, at 239. The OLG Stuttgart (see supra note 134, 6) has
however recently reaffirmed its view that such an appeal is not admissible (nicht statthaft).
152 See Oberlandesgericht Karlsruhe, 1 Ws 152/04 (Jan. 10, 2005), available at http://www.
jurpc.de/rechtspr/20050052.htm; Oberlandesgericht Karlsruhe, 1 Ws 85/02 (Dec. 16, 2002),
available at http'/www.urteile.net/gerichte/olg-karlsruhe/Beschlussvom_16.12.2002_1
Ws 85 02.html; 52 DIE JUSTIz 270, 271 (2003). See also Oberlandesgericht Zweibracken, 1
Ws 424/79 (Feb. 05, 1980); 1 NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FOR STRAFRECHT 193 (1981); Oberlandes-
gericht Bremen, Ws 71/82 (Aug. 27, 1982); 5 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DER OBERLANDESGERICHTE
IN STRAFSACHEN UND OBER ORDNUNGSWIDRIGKEITEN § 175 no. 1 (Michael Lenke ed., loose
leaflet update Apr. 2009); Oberlandesgericht Koblenz, 1 Ws 164/94 (Sept. 5, 1994); 15 NEUE
ZEITSCHRIFr FOR STRAFRECHT 50 (1995); Oberlandesgericht Braunschweig, Ws 48/91 (Sept.
23, 1992); 12 ZEITSCHRiFr FOR WIRTSCHAFTS UND STEUERSTRAFRECHT 31 (1993); Kammer-
gericht, 4 Ws 220/89 (Mar. 26, 1990); 10 NEUE ZEITSCHRIFr FOR STRAFRECHT 355 (1990);
Oberlandesgericht Celle, 2 Ws 94/02 (Apr. 26, 2002). See also Oberlandesgericht K6ln, 1 Zs
120/03 - 19/03 (Mar. 28, 2003); 8 NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FOR STRAFRECHT, RECHTSPRECHUNGS-
REPORT 212 (2003); Oberlandesgericht Hani, 1 Ws 227/98 (Sept. 29, 1998); 22
STRAFVERTEIDIGER 128, 129 (2002).
153 See StrafprozeBordnung [StPO] [Code of Criminal Procedure Civil Code], Apr. 7, 1987,
§ 170.
'5"4 See id. § 172.
155 Oberlandesgericht Karlsruhe, 1 Ws 152/04 (Jan. 10, 2005); Oberlandesgericht Karlsruhe
1 Ws 85/02, supra note 152.
156 On the procedure to compel criminal proceedings (Klageerzwingungsverfahren), see
generally Wohlers, supra note 151, § 172 mn. 2 with further references on the case law;
Schmid, supra note 151, at 1124, § 172 mn. 1; P10d, supra note 151, § 172 inn. 1; WERNER
BEULKE, STRAFPROZESSRECHT 213, inn. 344 (2008).
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CPC section 153f constitutes a distinctive feature in the system of CPC sec-
tions 153 through 154f and this distinctive feature implies that the require-
ments contained in subs. 1 and 2 must be subjected to a strict legal control.
In a way, one can argue that a judicial control of the Prosecutor's dismissal
decision corresponds to the control of the ICC Prosecutor's non-
investigation decision by the Pre-Trial Chamber under Article 53(1)(c),
(3)(b) of the ICC Statute. 158 The need for judicial control is particularly evi-
dent with regard to the requirement that the offence is actually being prose-
cuted by an international criminal court or State (CPC section 153f(1) cl. 2,
(2) cl. 2 no. 4), since this requirement serves to fulfill the prevention of im-
punity as the overall aim of the substantive universal jurisdiction principle
provided for by CCAIL section 1.159 In fact, this requirement does not con-
stitute a discretionary element but a strict legal one as part of the normative
structure of CPC section 153f(2).
C. Spain
On March 17, 2009 D. Javier Ferrnndez Estrada, Procuradorjudi-
cial,160 filed a complaint (querella)61 before the Audiencia Nacional (AN),
the competent Spanish Court for national and transnational crimes,
162
against the "Bush Six.' ' 16 3 The complaint was first admitted by the compe-
tent investigating judge Uuez de instrucci6n) of the Fifth Circuit (iuzgado
157 Kai Ambos, Vdlkerrechtliche Bestrafungspflichten bei Schweren Menschenrechtsverlet-
zungen, 37 ARCHflV DES VOLKERRECHTS 319 (1999).
158 See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court arts. 53(1)(c), (3)(b), July 17,
1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.
159 For the same result, see Singelnstein & Stolle, supra note 118, at 119, who also consider
as reviewable the requirements of the accused being present in Germany (§ 153f subs. 1, cl.
1) and the admissible and intended extradition (§ 153f subs. 2, cl. 2).
160 The Procurador is a lawyer who represents private parties in any kind of judicial pro-
ceedings. See Real Decreto 1281/2002 art. 1.
161 The querella must always be presented by a procurador judicial. See Ley de Enjuicia-
miento Criminal (L.E. CRiM.), art. 277(1) [hereinafter LECJ].
162 According to Article 65(1) of the Ley Orginica del Poder Judicial [LOPJ], the Audien-
cia Nacional (AN) is competent, inter alia, for extraterritorial offences. See LOPJ art. 65(1)
(Spain). For a good English explanation of the jurisdiction and structure, see Lorena Bach-
maier Winter & Antonio del Moral Garcia, Criminal Law: Spain, in 4 INTERNATIONAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW 200 (June 2009) (Roger Blanpain et al. eds., 1999).
163 Escrito de querella al "Decanato de los Juzgados Centrales de Instrucci6n de la Audien-
cia Nacional para el Juzgado de Instrucci6n que por turno corresponda", March 17, 2009 (on
file with author). On the recent case against Israel for alleged war crimes in the Gaza cam-
paign, see Sharon Weill, The Targeted Killing of Salah Shedadeh: From Gaza to Madrid, 7
J.INT'L CRIM. JUST. 617 (2009). See also Ignacio de la Rasilla del Moral, The Swan Song of
Universal Jurisdiction in Spain, 9 INT'L CRIM. L. R. 777, 786 (2009), with further examples
at 784.
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central 5 de instrucci6n),'64 the well-known Baltazar Garz6n, on March 28,
2009. However, on April 23, the case was, at the request of the Attorney
General (who does not support the proceedings), 165 referred to investigating
judge Eloy Velasco. 166 This judge requested the U.S. authorities on May 4
to respond if the case is being or will be investigated in the U.S. 167 On the
other hand, Baltazar Garz6n opened an investigation on April 27, 2009
against "the possible authors, instigators, necessary cooperators, and ac-
complices" in the torturing of detainees at Guantdnamo. 168 The suspects
include "members of the American air forces or military intelligence and all
those who executed and/or designed a systematic torture plan and inhuman
and degrading treatment against prisoners under their custody."' 69
1. Initiation and jurisdiction
To understand how these cases are triggered one must first be aware
that the Spanish procedural system 17  provides for an actio popularis
(acusaci6n popular, popular accusation), 171 i.e., in principle every citizen
has the constitutional right to initiate criminal proceedings 72 by way of a
164 According to Article 88 of the LOPJ, the offences competence of the AN are to be in-
vestigated for the "Jueces Centrales de Instrucci6n" whose competence extends to the whole
Spanish territory. See LOPJ, supra note 162, art. 88.
165 See Christina Mateo-Yanguas, Spanish Court Considers Prosecuting Bush Officials,
GLOBAL POST, Apr. 18 2009, http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/spain/090415/spanish-
court-considers-prosecuting-bush-officials ("Attorney General Candido Conde-Pumpido said
he will not support the National Court pursuing the case . ). See also de la Rasilla del
Moral, supra note 163, at 788-89.
166 See Guantinamo La Fiscalia Espafiola Rechaza que Garz6n Instruya la Causa y Pide
Remitirla a otro Juez para que se Archive, LUKOR, http:/www.lukor.com/not-
por/0904/17132701.htm.
167 Sumario 19/97-L, Auto, Juzgado Central de lnstruccion num. 6, Diligencias Previas
134/2009 (May 4, 2009) (on file with author).
168 Sumario 19/97-L, Auto, Juzgado Central de Instruccion num. 5, Diligencias Previas
150/09-N, Torturas y Otros (Apr. 27, 2009) (on file with author). See also Christina Mateo-
Yanguas, Christina Mateo-Yanguna's Notebook: Garzon Stops at Nothing, GLOBAL POST,
Apr. 13, 2009, http://www.globalpost.com/bio/cristina-mateo-yangunas?page=l; Juez Gar-
zon abre Causa por Presuntas Torturas en Guantanamo (Apr. 29, 2009), http://informe2l.
com/actualidad/juez-garzon-abre-causa-presuntas-torturas-guantanamo.
169 Christina Mateo-Yanguas, Garzon Stops at Nothing, GLOBAL POST, Apr. 30, 2009,
http://www.globalpost.com/notebook/spain/090430/garzon-stops-at-nothing.
170 For a good overview of the Spanish procedural system in English, see Bachmaier Win-
ter & del Moral, supra note 162, at 203
171 On the English roots of the concept, see VICTOR MORENO CATENA ET. AL., 1 EL
PROCESO PENAL 395 (Tirant lo Banch ed. 2000); VICENTE GIMENO SENDRA, DERECHO
PROCESAL PENAL 206 (Colex ed., 2007). On the importance in the universal jurisdiction
cases, see Kaleck, supra note 15, at 955.
172 SPAIN CONST. art. 125.
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private complaint (querella) without being directly affected by the of-
fence. 173 The person who presses charges in criminal proceedings is called a
non-public or particular accuser (acusaci6n particular). 174 This right is not
limited to natural persons but also includes associations with regard to their
specific purpose as defined in their statutes or rules. 175 Thus, human rights
associations may initiate proceedings relating to the violation of human
rights. The popular accuser may ask for investigative measures to be or-
dered by the investigating judge if appropriate. The rationale of the popular
accusation lies in the idea of a democratization of criminal justice' 76 or, in
more concrete terms, the control of the State's exercise of the ius puniendi
in cases where there may be a private interest to prosecute. Yet in a recent
polemical case against a leading executive of the Banco Santander the Su-
preme Court (Tribunal Supremo) has limited this right stating that a case
cannot go to trial on the basis of an actio popularis alone if the Prosecutor
(Ministerio Publico) and the victim ask for the case to be dropped. 177 A few
months later, the same Court supported an accusation of a civil servants'
union called Manos Limpias despite objections by the Prosecutor, distin-
guishing this case from the one before. 17 8 In any case, the extensive use of
the querella, not least in the universal jurisdiction cases, has led critics to
call for restrictions. The basic argument is that the actio popularis does not
transfer the ius puniendi from the State to the citizens but only enables the
citizens to trigger an investigation, leaving the final decision to continue
such an investigation and thus exercise the ius puniendi in the hands of the
state. 179 Consequently, it is in the Prosecutor's discretion if he takes on the
case or not.
Apart from this controversy about the triggering power of ordinary
citizens, it is questionable if Spanish jurisdiction over these cases exists at
all. After years of jurisprudential and academic dispute over the correct in-
terpretation of the principle of universal jurisdiction contained in Article
173 LOPJ, supra note 162, art. 19(1). See JACOBO LOPEZ BOPUA DE QUIROGA, TRATADO DE
DERECHO PROCESAL PENAL 765 (2004). See also Jost MARTIN OSTOS, INTRODUCCION AL
DERECHO PROCESAL 62-63 (2006); MORENO CATENA ET AL., supra note 171, at 395; M.
OLLt SESt, JUSTICIA UNIVERSAL PARA CRiMENES INTERNACIONALES 427 (discussing the
prosecution of international crimes); Bachmaier Winter & del Moral, supra note 162, at 216-
17 (containing a short explanation in English).
174 For the distinction between the acusaci6n popular, acusaci6n particular and the acusa-
dor privado (for certain "private offences"), see Bachmaier Winter & del Moral, supra note
162, at 203.
175 See Constitutional Court, STC 241/1992 (Dec. 21, 1992).
176 MORENOCATENAET AL., supra note 171, at 395.
17 STS, Dec. 17, 2007 (Botin Case) (R.G.D., No. 1045/2007). Mr. Emilio Botin is the
president of the bank and one of its owners.
178 STS, Apr. 8, 2008 (Atutxa Case) (R.G.D., No. 54/2008).
179 GIMENO SENDRA, supra note 171, at 206.
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23(4) of the Ley Org6nica del Poder Judicial (LOPJ), 180 on June 25, 2009,
the Chamber of Deputies approved a reform which considerably limits the
Spanish jurisdiction over extraterritorial acts. ' 8' Under the old Article 23(4)
LOPJ, Spanish jurisdiction existed for acts "committed by Spanish nationals
or foreigners outside the national territory" 182 with regard to, inter alia,
genocide, terrorism and other offences for which an obligation to prosecute
exists in international treaties, 183 but the new law, while including crimes
against humanity and war crimes in the list of offences (Article 23(4)(a)
LOPJ),' 84 introduces the requirement of a link or connection to Spain
stating:
Notwithstanding the provisions contained in the international treaties and
conventions signed by Spain, for Spanish Tribunals to have jurisdiction
180 Act of 1 July 1985 of the Boletin Oficial del Estado (B.O.E. 1985, 157).
181 121/000028 Proyecto de Ley Orgdonica Complementaria de la Ley de Reforma de la
Legislaci6n Procesal para la Implantaci6n de la Nueva Oficina judicial, por la que se Modifi-
ca la Ley Orgdnica 6/1985, de 1 de Julio, del Poder Judicial. Boletin Oficial de las Corte
Generales, Congreso de los Diputados, IX Legislatura, Serie A: Proyectos de Ley 6 de julio
de 2009, Nitm. 28-3.
182 All translations from Spanish into English were done by the author.
183 The original text of LOPJ Article 23(4) reads as follows:
4. [S]erd competente la jurisdicci6n espafiola para conocer de los hechos cometidos
por espafioles o extranjeros fuera del territorio nacional susceptibles de tipificarse,
seg(m la ley penal espafiola, como alguno de los siguientes delitos:
a. Genocidio ....
b. Terrorismo.
c. Pirateria y apoderamiento ilicito de aeronaves.
d. Falsificaci6n de moneda extranj era.
e. Los delitos relativos a la prostituci6n y los de corrupci6n de menores o
incapaces.
f. Trfifico ilegal de drogas psicotr6picas, t6xicas y estupefacientes.
g. Trfifico ilegal o inmigraci6n clandestina de personas, sean o no trabaja-
dores.
h. Los relativos a la mutilaci6n genital femenina, siempre que los respon-
sables se encuentren en Espafia.
i.Y cualquier otro que, segfn los tratados o convenios internacionales, deba
ser perseguido en Espafia.
LOPJ, supra note 162, art. 23(4) (original).
184 While these crimes were not mentioned in the old Article 23(4) LOPJ (see id.), the
Supreme Court affirmed Spanish (extraterritorial) jurisdiction about crimes against humanity
by analogy. See STS, Oct. 1, 2007 (Scilingo Case) (R.J., No. 6). See also Alicia Gil Gil,
Principio de Legalidad y Crimenes Internacionales, in NUEVOS DESAFiOS DE DERECHO
PENAL INTERNACIONAL 391, 405-06 (Antonio Cuerda Riezu & Francisco Jimenez Garcia
eds., 2009); OLLE SESE, supra note 173, at 217, 243-44 (invoking universal jurisdiction on
the basis of a direct application of international criminal law).
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over the offences previously mentioned it shall be demonstrated that the
alleged responsible are present in Spanish territory or that victims of Span-
ish nationality exist or that any relevant connection with Spain can be ac-
knowledged and, that, in any case, no proceedings entailing an investiga-
tion and effective prosecution have been initiated in another competent
country or by an international tribunal for these offences.
The criminal process initiated before Spanish tribunals will be provision-
ally suspended when it is demonstrated that another process regarding the
alleged acts has been started in the country or the tribunal to which the
previous clause makes reference. 185
The Spanish Senate approved this reform on October 15, 2009 de-
leting, however, on the one hand, war crimes from the list of crimes men-
tioned in Article 23(4)(a) LOPJ and adding, on the other, a special reference
to "the conventions of international humanitarian law and human rights" to
the general clause extending the jurisdiction on the basis of Spain's interna-
tional treaty obligations. 186 Thus, in the result, at least the grave breaches of
185 The original text of article 23 no. 4 lit. (h) 2 and 3 reads:
Sin perjuicio de lo que pudieran disponer los tratados y convenios internacionales
suscritos por Espafia, para que puedan conocer los Tribunales espafioles de los an-
teriores delitos deberd quedar acreditado que sus presuntos responsables se encuen-
tran en Espafia o que existen victimas de nacionalidad espahola, o constatarse
algiin vinculo de conexi6n relevante con Espafia y, en todo caso, que en otro pais
competente o en el seno de un Tribunal intemacional no se ha iniciado procedi-
miento que suponga una investigaci6n y utia persecuci6n efectiva, en su caso, de
tales hechos punibles.
El proceso penal iniciado ante la jurisdicci6n espaflola se sobreseerd provisional-
mente cuando quede constancia del comienzo de otro proceso sobre los hechos de-
nunciados en el pais o por el Tribunal a los que se refiere el prrafo anterior.
LOPJ, supra note 162, art. 23(4)(h) (original) (emphasis added). For a critical analysis of this
reform, see Javier Chinch6n Alvarez, Andlisis Formal y Material de la Reforma del Princi-
pio de Jurisdiccirn Universal en la Legislacidn Espahola: De la Abrogacidn de Facto a la
Derogaci6n de lure, 30 DIARIO LA LEY, Secci6n Doctrina (nfim. 7211) 1 (2009), available at
http://www.laley.es/Content/Documento.aspx?idd=DT000012721 l&version=20090623&
verifyDocType=false&ebook=DT000012721 1_20090623; Manuel Ol16 Sesd, La Limitacirn
del Principio de Justicia Universal, Contraria al Derecho Internacional, 13 Iuius 17 (2009);
Manuel Ol16 Sesd, El Avance de la Justicia Universal, EL PAlS 35-36 (May 23, 2009),
available at http://www.elpais.com/articulo/opinion/avance/usticia/universal/elpepiopi/2009
0523elpepiopi_4/Tes.
186 The old article 23 no. 4 lit. (i), supra note 185, now reads (new art. 23 (4)(h) 1):
Cualquier otro que, segfin los tratados y convenios internacionales, en particular
los Convenios de derecho internacional humanitario y de proteccirn de los dere-
chos humanos, deba ser perseguido en Espafia.
Id. (emphasis added).
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the Geneva Conventions can be prosecuted by Spanish Tribunals; 187 in any
case, with this last minute change of the reform by the Senate it remains to
be seen what the Spanish Tribunals will make out of the new law. 188 The
new law entered into force November 4, 2009.189
With this reform the legislature in fact adopted the position of the
Spanish Supreme Court which, since its Guatemala decision of February 25,
2003,190 called for a "teleological reduction" of the principle of universal
jurisdiction. In this decision, the Court argued that for "criteria of rationali-
ty" and the "principle of no-intervention" the extraterritorial prosecution of
crimes on the basis of universal jurisdiction presupposes "the existence of a
connection with a national interest as a legitimizing element."' 19' More con-
cretely, the Court listed three alternative requirements: (1) the Spanish na-
tionality of the victims; (2) the existence of "other relevant Spanish inter-
ests;" or (3) on the basis of international treaties, the presence of the suspect
on Spanish territory and the non-extradition to another state with jurisdic-
tion. 192 Thus, the Court interpreted the principle of universal jurisdiction in
the sense of three traditional principles: passive personality, protection, and
representation (aut dedere aut iudicare).
In addition, the Court recognized, in principle, a criterion of subsi-
diarity according to which the Spanish jurisdiction only becomes active if
the other competent national jurisdictions or the ICC do not exercise their
jurisdiction. 193 This principle has been confirmed in the Cooperation Act
187 On their effect of universal jurisdiction see recently Roger O'Keefe, The Grave Breach-
es Regime and Universal Jurisdiction, 7 J. INT'L CPJM. JUST. 811 (2009).
188 For two Spanish colleagues (Javier Chinch6n and Manuel Ol16 Ses6), the reform proc-
ess remains "mysterious" and it is not clear what motivated the Senate to make this last
change (emails to the author on Nov. 16, 2009).
189 B.O.E. No. 266, 4 Nov. 2009, sect. I, at 92089.
190 See STS, Feb. 25, 2003 (R.J., No. 327) [hereinafter Guatemala Judgment]. Regarding
the background and the facts of this case and subsequent case law, see Mariona Llobet Angli,
El Alcance del Principio de Jurisdicci6n Universal Segin el Tribunal Constitucional, 4
INDRET. REVISTA PARA EL ANALISIS DEL DERECHO 3 (2006). See also Chinch6n Alvarez,
supra note 185, at 4; Alicia Gil Gil, Espaha, in JURISPRUDENCIA LATINOAMERICANA SOBRE
DERECHO PENAL INTERNACIONAL 471, 493 (Kai Ambos & Ezequiel Malarino eds., 2008);
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, ESPARA: EL DEBER DE RESPETAR LAS OBLIGACIONES DE DERECHO
INTERNACIONAL NO PUEDE SER ELUDIDO 10 (2005), available at http'/www.amnesty.org/es/
library/info/EUR41/003/2005/es.
191 Guatemala Judgment, supra note 190 (stating "existencia de una conexi6n con un in-
terds nacional como elemento legitimador... modulando su extensi6n con arreglo a criterios
de racionalidad y con respeto al principio de no-intervenci6n.").
192 Id.
193 Id. See also Chinch6n Alvarez, supra note 185, at 4; Gil Gil, supra note 190, at 494. For
a detailed analysis of this and other cases regarding subsidiarity, see Cedric Ryngaert, Apply-
ing the Rome Statute's Complementarity Principle: Drawing Lessons from the Prosecution
of Core Crimes by States Acting Under the Universality Principle, 19 CRiM. L.F. 153, 160
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with the ICC which states that the Spanish judicial authorities do, in prin-
ciple, refrain from any activity with regard to extraterritorial cases which
fall within the ICC's jurisdiction except preliminary urgent investigatory
measures within their competence.' 94 The Constitutional Court (Tribunal
Constitucional), however, rejected the Supreme Court's restrictive interpre-
tation. 195 It argued that it violates the right to an effective remedy guaran-
teed in Article 24(1) of the Spanish Constitution in that it entails an interpre-
tation against the letter of the law of Article 23(4) LOPJ and overlooks the
purpose of the principle of universal jurisdiction defacto abolishing it. 196 In
light of this decision and the subsidiarity principle as established by the ICC
Cooperation Act, the Plenary of the AN published an agreement (acuerdo)
in order to "unify criteria in the field of extraterritorial jurisdiction accord-
(2008) (however, referring incorrectly to a "Peruvian genocide case"). See also AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL, supra note 190, at 17. In casu, however, the Court rejected subsidiarity as
applied by the AN as the inferior tribunal arguing that it would imply a judgment about the
capacity of the judicial organs of a foreign and sovereign State. On this point, see Alicia Gil
Gil, Espaia, in PERSECUCION PENAL NACIONAL DE CRiMENES INTERNACIONALES EN AMERICA
LATINA Y ESPAifA 335, 358-59 (Kai Ambos & Ezequiel Malarino eds., 2003).
194 See Article 7(2) of the Ley Orgdinica 18/2003 de Cooperaci6n con la Corte Penal Inter-
nacional (December 2003), available at http//www.derechos.org/nizkor/icc/fiscpi.html,
which reads in the original:
Cuando se presentare una denuncia o querella ante un 6rgano judicial o del Minis-
terio Fiscal o una solicitud en un departamento ministerial, en relaci6n con hechos
sucedidos en otros Estados, cuyos presuntos autores no sean nacionales espahloles y
para cuyo enjuiciamiento pudiera ser competente la Corte, dichos 6rganos se abs-
tendrdn de todo procedimiento, limitdndose a informar al denunciante, querellante
o solicitante de la posibilidad de acudir directamente al Fiscal de la Corte, que
podri, en su caso, iniciar una investigaci6n, sin perjuicio de adoptar, si fuera nece-
sario, las primeras diligencias urgentes para las que pudieran tener competencia.
En iguales circunstancias, los 6rganos judiciales y el Ministerio Fiscal se abs-
tendrin de proceder de oficio.
Id. For a critique regarding the subsidiarity principle, see OLLE SESE, supra note 173, at 419.
195 See Tribunal Constitucional, STC 237/2005 (Sept., 26, 2005). For criticism, see Llobet
Angli, supra note 190, 6-7, 11. In favor, see Chinch6n Alvarez, supra note 185, 4-5; Gil Gil,
supra note 190, at 494-95 in conjunction with all further references. See also Ryngaert,
supra note 193, at 161; de la Rasilla del Moral, supra note 163, at 778.
196 Tribunal Constitucional, supra note 195, at 32-33. The case states:
[D]esborda los cauces de lo constitucionalmente admisible desde el marco que es-
tablece el derecho a la tutela judicial efectiva consagrada en el art. 24.1 CE, en la
medida en que supone una reducci6n contra legem a partir de criterios correctores
que ni siquiera implicitamente pueden considerarse presentes en la ley y que,
adems, se muestran palmariamente contrarios a la finalidad que inspira la institu-
ci6n, que resulta alterada hasta hacer irreconocible el principio de jurisdicci6n uni-
versal ... hasta casi suponer una derogaci6n defacto del art. 23.4 LOPJ.
See id
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ing to Article 23(4) LOPJ."' 197 Accordingly, the AN will analyze, de oficio,
its own jurisdiction as well as the activity, or lack thereof, of the territorial
and international tribunals; it will, as a rule (como regla), on the basis of a
criterion of reasonability (criterio de razonabilidad), accept its jurisdiction
if the other jurisdictions do not act, except that this would constitute an
excess or abuse of right because of the absolute alienation (ajeineidad) of
the case to the Spanish jurisdiction dealing with totally strange and/or re-
mote offences and places without any direct interest of the querellante or
relation with them. 198 With this latter criterion, the AN pursued the obvious
objective to exclude politically motivated prosecutions but it remains to be
seen if this criterion can be determined more exactly by the case law.' 99 In
any case, the AN certainly wants to take a more cautious approach to extra-
territorial (universal) jurisdiction, an approach which goes hand-in-hand
with its future emphasis on the fight against organized crime. 200
In a subsequent decision, the Supreme Court, while formally abid-
ing by the Constitutional Court judgment invoking the supremacy of the
Constitution,2 °' in substance affirmed its restrictive interpretation of univer-
sal jurisdiction extensively. 202
2. The consequences of the dejure abrogation of universal jurisdiction
by the new law for ongoing investigations
The legislative reform of Article 23(4) LOPJ follows the jurispru-
dence of the Supreme Court and thus converts the defacto derogation of the
principle of universal jurisdiction into a de jure one. While under the old
law the mere text of Article 23(4) did not provide for a limitation and, thus,
the Supreme Court's teleological restriction could well be rejected as contra
197 See Acuerdo del Pleno de la Sala de lo Penal de ]a Audiencia Nacional Relativo a la
lnterpretaci6n de la Sentencia del Tribunal Constitucional Sobre Guatemala (Nov. 3, 2005),
available at httpJ/www.derechos.org/nizkor/espana/doc/interp.htrnl ("[P]ara unificar crite-
rios en materia dejurisdicci6n extraterritorial del art. 23.4. LOPJ .... ").
' See id at no. 4 ("[S]alvo que se aprecie exceso o abuso de derecho por la absoluta aje-
neidad del asunto por tratarse de delitos y lugares totalmente extrafios y/o alejados y no acre-
ditar el denunciante o querellante interds directo o relaci6n con ellos." (footnote omitted)).
For a full english version, see de la Rasilla del Moral, supra note 163, at 782.
199 See Gil Gil, supra note 190, at 496. For criticism, see OLLE SESt, supra note 173, at
376-77 (arguing basically that it is always "reasonable" to prosecute international core
crimes and that these are never "strange" to the Spanish jurisdiction).
200 As declared by its President Angel de Juanes on July 10, 2009 in an interview with the
Spanish news agency Efe. See Juanes Afirma que la Audiencia Nacional "Tiene Futuro"
como Tribunal Especial Contra el Crimen Organizado (July 7, 2009), httpJ/www.soitu.es/
soitu/2009/07/10/info/1247227098_865123.html.
201 LOPJ, supra note 162, art. 5(1).
202 Tribunal Supremo, Judgment of 20 June 2006, case 645/2006 (Falun Gong). See also
Llobet Angli, supra note 190, at 7.
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legem, this restriction is now explicitly part of the law. Thus, Spanish juris-
diction only exists if one of the three mentioned traditional principles is
applicable. In addition, even if Spanish jurisdiction exists, a Spanish prose-
cution is always subsidiary to proceedings in a country with jurisdiction or
before an International Criminal Tribunal. While this subsidiarity principle
had already been read into the old law by the Supreme Court, it is now ex-
plicitly part of the written law.
As for the case at hand, however, the question arises whether this
new legislation applies at all to investigations which started before its entry
into force. The jurisdictional norms of the LOPJ are considered as proce-
dural norms by the case law 20 3 and the doctrine. 204 As a consequence, the
applicable procedural law is not the one which is valid at the moment of
commission of the relevant offence (principle of non-retroactivity) but, ac-
cording to the tempus regit actum rule, the one in force at the moment in
203 Auto de la Sala de lo Penal de la Audiencia Nacional Confirmando la Jurisdicci6n de
Espafia para Conocer de los Crimenes de Genocidio y Terrorismo Cometidos durante la
Dictadura Argentina, Madrid, Nov. 4, 1998, available at http://www.derechos.
org/nizkor/arg/espana/audi.html [hereinafter Audencia Nacional]. Fundamento de derecho
tercero:
Aplicabilidad actual del Art. 23, apartado 4, de la Ley Orgdnica del Poder Judicial,
como norma procesal ahora vigente. El Art. 23, apartado 4, de la Ley Orgdnica del
Poder Judicial -en cuanto proclama la jurisdicci6n de Espafia para el conocimiento
de determinados hechos cometidos por espafioles o extranjeros fuera del territorio
nacional susceptibles de tipificarse, segiin la Ley penal espafiola, como alguno de
los delitos que enumera-, no se aplica retroactivamente cuando la jurisdicci6n pro-
clamada se ejerce en el tiempo de la vigencia de la norma -tal sucede en este caso-,
con independencia de cu6l fue el tiempo de los hechos que se enjuician. El citado
Art. 23, apartado 4, de la Ley Orginica del Poder Judicial, no es norma de puni-
ci6n, sino procesal. No tipifica o pena ninguna acci6n u omisi6n y se limita a pro-
clamar la jurisdicci6n de Espafia para el enjuiciamiento de delitos definidos y san-
cionados en otras Leyes. La norma procesal en cuesti6n ni es sancionadora desfa-
vorable ni es restrictiva de derechos individuales, por lo que su aplicaci6n a efectos
de enjuiciamiento penal de hechos anteriores a su vigencia no contraviene el Art. 9,
apartado 3, de la Constituci6n Espafiola. La consecuencia juridica restrictiva de de-
rechos, derivada de la comisi6n de un delito de genocidio -la pena-, trae causa de la
norma penal que castiga el genocidio, no de la norma procesal que atribuye juris-
dicci6n a Espafia para castigar el delito. El principio de legalidad (Art. 25 de la
Constituci6n Espafiola), impone que los hechos sean delito -conforme a las Leyes
espafiolas, segfin el Art. 23, apartado 4, tan mencionado-, cuando su ocurrencia,
que la pena que pueda ser impuesta venga ya determinada por Ley anterior a la
perpetraci6n del crimen, pero no que la norma de jurisdicci6n y de procedimiento
sea preexistente al hecho enjuiciable. La jurisdicci6n es presupuesto del proceso,
no del delito.
Id.
204 MORENO CATENA ET AL., supra note 171, at 203 ("El citado art. 23.4 LOPJ noes norma
de punici6n, sino procesal.") See also VICTOR MORENO CATENA & VALENTIN CORTES
DOMINGUEZ, INTRODUCCION AL DERECHO PROCESAL PENAL 30 (2004).
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which the relevant procedural act took place. 20 5 Accordingly, the decisive
moment for the applicable procedural law is the time (tempus) when the
decisive procedural act (actum) has been undertaken, i.e., in casu, when the
jurisdictional nexus has been invoked. In general terms, a new procedural
law does not apply to investigations or prosecutions which have been for-
mally initiated before its entry into force, i.e., in terms of Spanish procedur-
al law, where the complaint has already been received by the competent
authority and this authority has initiated an investigation (auto de incoaci6n
de diligencias preliminares).206 This means, in principle, that the new law
has no retroactive effect and, with regard to our case, that the old law would
be applicable since the process was initiated on March 17, 2009, or with the
acceptance of the investigating judge on March 28, and at that very moment
the jurisdictional link was required.20 7 Furthermore, the Spanish jurisdiction
could also follow from the passive personality principle-albeit not con-
tained in Article 23 LOPJ but recognized by the case law--as to Spanish
nationals detained in Guantdnamo; this applies, for example, to the former
detainee Hamed Abderraman.2 o8
Yet this leads to another problem. Since the crime of torture, neither
as an individual crime (Article 174 C6digo Penal (CP), Criminal Code),
crime against humanity (Article 607 bis (8) CP), or war crime (Article 609
CP), is explicitly mentioned in the old version of Article 23(4) LOPJ, the
jurisdiction for torture as an individual crime may only be based on Article
23(4)(i) in connection with the 1984 U.N. Torture Convention. This provi-
sion refers to international treaties which impose an obligation on Spain to
prosecute the crimes contained in them.209 The Supreme Court,210 supported
by most academic writers, 21 has qualified the Geneva Conventions with
205 Cf. SANTIAGO MIR PUIG, DERECHO PENAL: PARTE GENERAL 122 ran. 35 (2006); Gil Gil,
supra note 190, at 363-64.
206 On the initiation of the criminal process by the filing of the notitia criminis, see GIMENO
SENDRA, supra note 171, at 206. See also RicARDo RODRiGUEZ FERNANDEZ, EL PROCESO
PENAL: NocioNEs BASICAs 60 (2006); FRANcIsco RAMOS MENDEZ, ENJUICIAMIENTO
CRIMINAL. OCTAVA LECTURA CONSTITUCIONAL 37 (2006).
207 For the same result, see 011 Sesd, supra note 185, at 19; too superficial, see de la Rasil-
la del Moral, supra note 163, at 804.
208 See Alicia Gil Gil, La Turbia Herencia de GuantAnamo (Feb. 4, 2009), available at
http./www.elpais.com/articulo/opinion/turbia/herencia/Guantanamo/epepiopi/2009204elpe
piopi_26/Tes. See also de la Rasilla del Moral, supra note 163, at 805.
209 See the original wording of Article 23(4)(i) in supra note 183 ("[S]egfin los tratados o
convenios intemacionales, deba ser perseguido en Espafia.") (emphasis added). For a critique
of a restrictive interpretation, see OLLt SESE, supra note 173, at 215-16.
210 STS, Dec. 11, 2006 (Couso case) (R.G.D. 1.240/2006).
21 See Gil Gil, supra note 190, at 362-63; J. CEREZO MIR, CURSO DE DERECHO PENAL
EsPA&OL I 257 (2004); A. Remiro Brotons, Los crimenes de Derecho Internacional y su
Persecuci6n Judicial, in EL DERECHO PENAL INTERNACIONAL 72 (2001); A. SANCHEZ
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regard to their grave breaches as such treaties. Thus, torture committed as a
grave breach within the framework of an international armed conflict (e.g.,
Article 50 of the First Geneva Convention) could be prosecuted by Spanish
Tribunals. As to torture as an individual crime, under the 1984 U.N. Torture
Convention the AN held, in the Chile and Argentina cases, that this Con-
vention also constitutes a treaty in the sense of Article 23(4)(i) LOP J; 212 yet
the AN does not discuss whether a treaty within the meaning of this provi-
sion must oblige the State Party to prosecute and punish its offences inde-
pendently of the place of commission and, in the affirmative, whether the
Torture Convention does so. 21 3 As to the latter question, the relevant Article
5 of the Torture Convention clearly refers to the principles of territoriality,
active, and passive personality (paragraph l(a) to (c) as well as to the prin-
ciple of representation in paragraph 2), i.e., it does not provide for universal
jurisdiction. The Spanish Supreme Court could, in the Guatemala case, get
around the problem by invoking passive personality under Article 5(1)(c) of
the Torture Convention since there were Spanish victims in the case.214 Be
LEGIDO, JUISDicci6N UNIVERSAL PENAL Y DERECHO INTERNACIONAL 71 (2004); Francisco
Jim6nez Garcia, Justicia Universal e Inmunidades Estatales: Justicia o Impunidad: i Una
Encruciada Dualista para el Derecho Internacional?, 18 ANUARIO DE DERECHO
INTERNACIONAL 87 (2002); Jos6 B. Acosta Est6vez, Las Infracciones Graves de los Conve-
nios de Ginebra en el Derecho Penal Espahol Bajo el Principio de Jurisdicci6n Universal, 7
ANUARIO MEXICANO DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL 13 (2007). Against this view, see Bemar-
do Feij6o Sdnchez, in COMENTARIOS AL C6DIGO PENAL 1432 (G. Rodriguez Mourullo et al.
eds., 1997); F. MuRoz CONDE, DERECHO PENAL: PARTE ESPECIAL 757 (1999).
212 See Audencia Nacional, supra note 203, at Part 7.
Las torturas denunciadas formarian parte del delito de mayor entidad de genocidio
o terrorismo. Por ello resulta est6ril examinar si el delito de tortura es, en nuestro
Derecho, delito de persecuci6n universal por la via del art. 23, apartado 4, letra g),
de la Ley Org.nica del Poder Judicial, puesto en relaci6n con el art. 5 de la Con-
venci6n de 10 de diciembre de 1984 contra la tortura y otros tratos o penas crueles,
inhumanos o degradantes. Si Espafia tiene jurisdicci6n para la persecuci6n del ge-
nocidio en el extranjero, la investigaci6n y enjuiciamiento tendrd necesariamente
que alcanzar a delitos de tortura integrados en el genocidio. Y no s6lo en el caso de
victimas de nacionalidad espafiola, conforme podria resultar del art. 5, apartado 1,
letra c), de la Convenci6n citada, que no constituye una obligaci6n ineludible para
los Estados firmantes. Espafia tendria jurisdicci6n propia como derivada de un tra-
tado intemacional en el caso del apartado 2 del art. 5 de la Convenci6n menciona-
da, pero, como se ha dicho, la cuesti6n es irrelevante juridicamente a los efectos de
la apelaci6n y del sumario.
Id.
213 Gil Gil, supra note 190, at 491 (rejecting both concepts and therefore disagreeing with
the AN); confusing on this provision, see Weill, supra note 163, at 620.
214 Guatemala Judgment, supra note 190 (in Fundamento de derecho duodecimo affirming
the universal consensus with regard to the duty to prosecute and punish torture as well as the
obligation of State parties to prosecute suspects present on the territory or, inter alia, in case
of Spanish victims ("personalidadpasiva que permite perseguir los hechos cuando la victim
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that as it may, it may well be argued that a treaty in the sense of Article
23(4)(i) need not provide for universal jurisdiction itself. Rather, what is
required is--as in the case of practically identical section 6 no. 9 of the
German Criminal Code12 '5-an international treaty containing a duty to
prosecute; this treaty-based duty alone serves as the legitimizing link for the
extraterritorial application of the State party's criminal law; no further links
are necessary. 16 If one follows this broader view, Spanish jurisdiction
would exist in principle for extraterritorial acts of torture. Still, it may be
limited by the now apparently settled criteria of subsidiarity and reasonabil-
ity as developed by the case law and the underlying rationale of the recent
reform. It seems especially clear now that politically motivated prosecutions
are no longer desired.
III. CONCLUSION
A pure or absolute theory of universal jurisdiction is based on a
normative concept of universal jurisdiction which conceives the universal
and transnational prosecution of international core crimes as the defense of
universal values common to all mankind and enshrined in international hu-
man rights, humanitarian and international criminal law treaties, and other
217documents. Such a normative foundation of universal jurisdiction also
finds support in a normative theory of international core crimes, in particu-
lar crimes against humanity, as developed by David Luban.218 If one sees in
these crimes, following Luban, an attack against all humankind, and thus
sea de la nacionalidad de ese Estado y ste lo considere apropiado."). For a critique, see Gil
Gil, supra note 190, at 492.
215 For the text, see supra text accompanying note 79.
216 This has also been recognized with regard to the identical German provision (see id) by
the German Supreme Court (see Bundesgerichtshof, 3 StR 372/00 (Feb. 21, 2001), in 46
BUNDESGERICHTSHOFS IN STRAFSACHEN 292, 307 (2001)) and by the majority doctrine, see
Ambos, supra note 84, § 6 mn. 20 with further references. In a similar vein, see OLLt SESt,
supra note 173, at 203, 220, 243-44 (basically arguing that universal jurisdiction exists as a
general principle of international criminal law for core crimes (crimenes de primer grado),
including torture, and as such must be applied directly on the domestic level). For a more
restrictive view, see Gerhard Werle & Florian Jessberger, § 6 Auslandstaten Gegen Interna-
tional Geschiitzte Rechtsgiiter, in 1 LEIPZIGER KOMMENTAR STRAFGESETZBUCH § 6 mn. 109,
112 (Gerhard Dannecker et al. eds., 2007) (arguing that the respective treaty must provide for
a duty to prosecute on the basis of universal jurisdiction and that the German jurisdiction
cannot reach beyond the jurisdiction provided for in the treaty).
217 For the full argument, see AMBOS, supra note 78, at 5, § 3 mn. 94; Kai Ambos, '§ 1
Anwendungsbereich', in MONCHNER KOMMENTAR STRAFGESETZBUCH. NEBENSTRAFRECHT
III. VOLKERSTRAFGESETZBUCH 461, 465, § 1 mn. 4 (Wolfgang Joecks et al. eds., 2009), both
with references. See also in this vein OLLE SESt, supra note 173, at 247.
218 This theory has been most convincingly developed by David Luban, A Theory of Crimes
Against Humanity, 29 YALE J. INT'L. L. 85 (2004).
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considers a criminal against humanity as a hostis humani generis,219 every
individual, acting as a representative of the humankind as a whole, has an
interest, a right, or even a duty to repress these crimes. 220 Universal jurisdic-
tion appears under this theory as a form of vigilante jurisdiction in which
everyone is interested and entitled to bring the criminal against humanity to
justice 22 but, in order to avoid abuses linked to any form of private justice
of that kind, it is necessary to delegate the exercise of universal jurisdiction
to states and tribunals which comply with fair trial standards.222 Thus, uni-
versal jurisdiction is a "kind of delegated or representative jurisdiction, de-
rived from the vigilante jurisdiction. ', 223
While such a theoretical foundation is sound and indeed makes a
theoretically compelling case for an unlimited universal jurisdiction regime,
its practical application has generated various problems which are partly of
a political nature and partly of a technical-practical nature. The most ob-
vious political problem of universal (indeed, any extraterritorial jurisdic-
tion), is its unavoidable interference into the judicial affairs of the territorial
state. While this interference may be legally justified on the basis of the
normative concept of universal jurisdiction defended in this paper, 224 it can-
not be denied that its political and diplomatic implications can be counter-
productive, especially if a "developed," strong, "first world" State (or even
worse, a former colonial power) extends its jurisdiction into the domain of a
"underdeveloped," weak, "third world" State (former colony). Clearly, uni-
versal jurisdiction of this kind--and this has been mostly its prac-
tice-smacks of neo-colonial domination and touches upon understandable
sensitivities of any people or government in the poorer parts of the world. 225
Indeed, from this perspective, it is easily understandable that for many like-
minded States the establishment of the ICC was also seen as a more legiti-
mate tool in the fight against impunity than the continuing reliance on third
219 Id. at 91-92, 137, 139-40, 160.
220 Id. at 137, 141 ("To say that humanity has an interest in suppressing crimes against
humanity is to say that human individuals share that interest .... Also, "interest in repress-
ing CaH is universal among people, not necessarily among states." (emphasis in original)).
221 Id. at 140-41, 160.
222 Id. at 142-43, 145 (referring to natural justice standards).
223 Id. at 143, 160.
224 See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
225 For a recent discussion of the African sensibilities vis-6-vis the ICC which a fortiori
exist vis-6-vis third states prosecuting African case on the basis of universal jurisdiction, see
Charles Chernor Jalloh, Regionalizing International Criminal Law? 9 INT'L CRiM. L. R. 445,
462, 496-97 (2009) (referring, inter alia, to Anghie and Chimni, two scholars of the so-called
Third World Approaches to International Law who argue that "it was principally through
colonial expansion that international law achieved one of its defining characteristics: univer-
sality.").
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states' universal jurisdiction. If, on the other hand, governments of strong
states are the object of universal jurisdiction litigation, like in the cases at
hand, only few forum States may be able to resist their pressure to terminate
proceedings or to not initiate them in the first place. Yet there is also the
other extreme of hijacking criminal justice for purely political purposes or
initiating proceedings against political opponents or enemies without having
reliable evidence or even indicia for the commission of international crimes.
The right of private citizens to trigger criminal proceedings, independent of
any victim status as in the above discussed actio popularis, is highly prob-
lematic and open to abuse. Obviously, the concerns with regard to such
broad power for private individuals to trigger criminal proceedings must be
distinguished from victims' participation in criminal proceedings for serious
human rights violations. Such participation, if it is substantial and not an
"empty ritual,, 2 26 is highly desirable since it lends these proceedings much
more legitimacy as these proceedings often depend on victims' testimo-
ny. 2
2 7
Apart from these political problems, the experience in universal ju-
risdiction litigation has also shown that there are many practical-
sometimes insurmountable-problems in bringing such cases to a success-
ful end. While the often criticized lack of infrastructure and capacity in
some European countries may be solved by the creation of special police
and prosecutorial units and the providing of sufficient resources on the part
of the governments concerned, 228 it is much more difficult to tackle all the
problems linked to the necessary evidence gathering abroad in such pro-
ceedings.229 The difficulties start with logistical problems--like security and
transport--and ignorance of the local language and culture and end with a
lack of cooperation on the part of the territorial State. In addition, the inves-
tigations are regularly of a highly complex and sensitive nature. From a
purely practical perspective, it is easily understandable that practitioners
think twice before they undertake such investigations.
All these problems, together with the pressure by some major pow-
ers, especially the U.S. under the Bush administration, caused the universal
rollback of universal jurisdiction,23 ° as confirmed by the law and practice of
226 For a recent critique with regard to the Cambodian Extraordinary Chambers, see Mah-
dev Mohan, The Paradox of Victim-Centrism: Victim Participation at the Khmer Rouge
Tribunal, 9 INT'L CRIM. L. R. 733, 752 (2009).
227 See Kaleck, supra note 15, at 975-76.
228 See HRW, supra note 29, at 34-35; Kaleck, supra note 15, at 953, 974-75.
229 See Kaleck, supra note 15, at 961.
230 According to the most comprehensive study of the Max Planck Institute for Foreign and
International Criminal Law (see NATIONALE STRAFVERFOLGUNG VOLKERRECHTLICHER
VERBRECHEN (Albin Eser et al. eds., 2003-2006), extraterritorial jurisdiction on the basis of
universal jurisdiction is "practically always limited by one way or the other." Either it de-
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the countries analyzed in this paper. This development led to the gradual
substitution of absolute or "true" universal jurisdiction in a proper sense by
its subsidiary or cooperative surrogates. 231 The reference to universal juris-
diction in absentia in this context is, however, misleading. It mixes presence
as a factual requirement, which may condition a criminal prosecution in
practical terms with presence as a legal requirement in the trial phase in
procedural systems, which do not allow-unlike e.g., the French and Italian
systems-for an in absentia trial. Yet, the presence in the forum State is not
a constitutive element of universal jurisdiction, i.e., presence in this sense
concerns only the "jurisdiction to enforce," but not the "jurisdiction to pre-
scribe" or "to adjudicate ' 232 which exist independent of such a presence.
pends on an international (treaty-based) duty to prosecute (in Austria, Belarus, China, Croa-
tia, England and Wales, Estland, Greece, Poland, Russia) or on the presence of the suspect in
the forum State (Canada, Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro, Spain, the Netherlands, Switzer-
land, the U.S.). Only in exceptional cases does universal jurisdiction apply in an unlimited
form to all international core crimes (Australia, Germany, Slovenia) or for some of them
(Finland, Italy, Israel, Sweden). See Helmut Kreicker, V6lkerstrafrecht im Ldndervergleich,
in 7 NATIONALE STRAFVERFOLGUNG VOLKERRECHTLICHER VERBRECHEN 191 (2006) (transla-
tion from German by the author). More recently, Wolfgang Kaleck found that more than fifty
court proceedings and a dozen convictions took place in Europe between 1998 and 2008 in
universal jurisdiction cases. See Kaleck, supra note 15, at 931.
231 See the dissenting votes of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans, and Buergenthal in Arrest War-
rant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), Joint Separate Opinion of Judges Higgins,
Kooijmans and Buergenthal, 2002 I.C.J. 21 (Feb. 14), available at http'J/www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/121/8136.pdf ("trend . . . for the trial and punishment of certain
crimes ... committed extraterritorially[ ]" but no "classical assertion of a universal jurisdic-
tion . .. having no relationship or connection with the forum State."). See also REYDAMS,
supra note 22, at 223 ("The practice of most States ... falls under the co-operative limited
universality principle."). See also Ambos, supra note 217, at 472-73 § 1 mn. 15.
232 On the different forms of jurisdiction, see AM. RESTATEMENT (TtIRD) OF FOREIGN REL.
L. See also Werner Meng, Regeln fiber die Jurisdiktion der Staaten im Amerikanischen Res-
tatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law, 27 ARCHIlV DES VOLKERRECHTS 156, 163--64
(1989); Michael Akehurst, Jurisdiction in International Law, 46 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 145
(1972); Anthony J. Colangelo, Constitutional Limits on Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: Terror-
ism and the Intersection of National and International Law, 48 HARV. INT'L L.J. 121,
126 (2007); ROBERT CRYER ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
AND PROCEDURE 37 (2007) (referring to "legislative," "adjudicative," and "executive juris-
diction").
233 In the same vein, see Thomas Weigend, Grund und Grenzen Universaler Gerichtsbar-
keit, in FESTSCHRIFT FOR ALBIN ESER 955, 970 (J6rg Arnold et al. eds., 2005). See also
CRYER ET AL., supra note 232, at 45; ROBERT KOLB & PH-LIP GRANT, DROIT INTERNATIONAL
PtNAL 455, 463-64 (2008); Herbert Ascensio, Are Spanish Courts Backing Down on Un-
iversality? The Supreme Tribunal's Decision in Guatemalan Generals, 1 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST.
690, 700 (2003) (presence is "only a procedural condition"); Roger O'Keefe, Universal
Jurisdiction: Clarifying the Basic Concept, 2 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 735, 750-51, 755 (2004).
For a different view, see Cedric Ryngaert, Universal Jurisdiction in an ICC Era-A Role to
Play for EU Member States with the Support of the European Union, 14 EUR. J. C., CRIM. L.
& CRIM. JUST. 46, 52, 54 (2006).
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An investigation may well begin in the absence of the suspect, but a result-
ing trial can normally not be held in absentia.234
In any case, subsidiary or cooperative universal jurisdiction, some-
times enriched by highly normative criteria such as reasonableness and con-
venience to prosecute extraterritorially, makes it more important than ever
to strengthen, on the one hand, the criminal justice systems of the territorial
states and the ICC and, on the other, to think in broader strategic terms. In-
deed, it is high time to develop a comprehensive strategy in which criminal
prosecution on an extraterritorial, universal basis is only one of a variety of
tools available to bring perpetrators of serious human rights violations to
account. As one leading human rights lawyer put it: "universal jurisdiction
as a sometimes overestimated but still important tool that should be consi-
dered and used alongside other local, regional, and international remedies.
Legal efforts should be embedded in broader interdisciplinary strategies. '235
Contrary to increasingly popular neo-punitivist approaches, wide-
spread, for example, among human rights activists in Latin America,236
which seem to see criminal law as the cure for all structural ills of their so-
cieties, we should not lose sight of the fundamental principles of criminal
law which are the product of long fights for fairness and the rule of law. 237
We should indeed remind ourselves that according to the classical liberal
criminal law theories, criminal law is only the ultima ratio, the last resort.238
234 Cf Kaleck, supra note 15, at 959.
235 Id. at 980.
236 For a radical critique, see Daniel Pastor, La Deriva Neopunitivista de Organismos y
Activistas como Causa del Desprestigio Actual de los Derechos Humanos, 10 NUEVA
DOCTRINA PENAL 73 (2005A).
237 I have made this point repeatedly, most recently in Kai Ambos, Command Responsibili-
ty and Organisationsherrschaf: Ways of Attributing International Crimes to the 'Most Re-
sponsible', in SYSTEM CRIMINALITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 127 (Andr6 Nollkaemper &
Harmen van der Wilt eds., 2009).
238 The humanist argument for a restrictive use of criminal law and in particular its sanc-
tions can already be found in the work of Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) when he makes the
case for pure retribution rejecting punishing for preventive purposes, i.e., to (negatively)
deter or (positively) encourage others, since this would mean to instrurnentalize the person
punished for another purpose that his having broken the law. See IMMANUEL KANT,
METAPHYSIK DER SIrEN (1919) (1785). From a similar humanist perspective Cesar Beccaria
(1738-1794) tried to solve the conflict between the "utilitarist purpose of punishment and
penal humanism" by calling for proportional punishment which imposes on the guilty the
"less physical suffering possible." See DEi DELITTI E DELLE PENE § 15 (1828). On both, see
MARIO A. CATTANEO, AUFKLARUNG UIND STRAFRECHT, 33, 37, 39, 42-43 (1998). In a similar
vein, Paul Johann Anselm von Feuerbach (1775-1833) called for a restrictive application of
coercion (Zwang) by the State, also in the field of criminal law and punishment. See 1
REVISION DER GRUNDSATZE UND GRUNDBEGRIFFE DES POSITIVEN PEINLICHEN RECHTS 31
(1966) (1799). See also Arthur Kaufmann, Subsidiaritdit und Strafrecht, in GRUNDFRAGEN
DER GESAMTEN STRAFRECHTSWISSENSCHAFT: FESTSCHRIFT FOR HEINRICH HENKEL 89, 103
(Claus Roxin et al. eds., 1974). Among English philosophers, John Stuart Mill (1806-1873)
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One should recall that the exercise of the ius puniendi is the most powerful
weapon of the State and that this weapon can also be abused to repress civil
unrest and dissident voices.239 Indeed, criminal law has always been, and is
still being, both used and abused in this sense; current examples such as
Burma, China, Russia, and Iran abound and sadly show how liberal theorists
in their call for a cautious use of criminal law have always been right. In-
deed, much more reflection is necessary as to the role criminal law should
play in dealing with serious human rights violations. While there must cer-
tainly be an ingredient of criminal law if important legal interests are at
stake and serious crimes are being committed, the transitional justice dis-
course 24 0 shows that criminal law must be part of a range of measures and
should always be applied carefully.
called for a restrictive use of the criminal law in the sense of ultima ratio with regard to
"justice" as "a name for certain moral requirements... higher in the scale of social utility...
than any others" and which therefore may be protected and promoted "by the sterner charac-
ter of its sanctions." See UTILITARIANISM, LIBERTY, AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 59-
60 (1948) (1863). See also GERHARD SEHER, LIBERALISMUS UND STRAFE: ZUR STRAFRECHTS-
THEORIE JOEL FENBERGS 32-33 (2000).
239 See Kaleck, supra note 15, at 978 ("[fludging and incarcerating individuals is still an
exercise of power that may violate the rights of the accused .... "
240 Cf. Kai Ambos, The Legal Framework of Transitional Justice: A Systematic Study with
a Special Focus on the Role of the ICC, in BUILDING A FUTURE ON PEACE AND JUSTICE:
STUDIES ON TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND DEVELOPMENT 19, 22 (Kai
Ambos et al. eds., 2009). For a recent critique on an exclusively retributive approach from an
empirical perspective, see Janine Natalya Clark, The Limits of Retributive Justice: Findings
of an Empirical Study in Bosnia and Hercegovina, 7 J.INT'L CRIM. JUST. 463 (2009); equally
critical from a sentencing perspective, see Ralph Henham, Towards Restorative Sentencing
in International Criminal Law, 9 INT'L CRIM. L. R. 809 (2009) (arguing for more restorative
trial outcomes).
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